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A Meticulous Food Safety Plan Today Avoids Handcuffs Tomorrow
Kim Bousquet*
In August 2010, thousands of people across the United States
were poisoned by eating eggs unknowingly tainted with Salmonella
enteritidis bacteria.1 Following a lengthy investigation, the owners of the
facility where the outbreak began were sentenced to three months in
prison.2 This is not a one-off case; poor food safety practices are
responsible for several outbreaks and often end in incarceration.3
Filthy hen houses, diseased fruit storage, and negligent food
processing may be the last thing we want to imagine, but these
practices have much to teach today’s food producers.
This article first examines how poor food production
practices can lead to an environment ripe for spread of disease and an
unacceptable level of contamination. Then, it explores what companies

*Kim Bousquet, JD, MS, is a partner in the St. Louis, Missouri, law firm Thompson
Coburn LLP. Kim received her JD from the University of Oregon School of Law and
her Masters of Science in Environmental Studies also from the University of Oregon.
Kim is currently a candidate in the Food and Agricultural Law LLM program at the
University of Arkansas. Kim’s LLM work focuses on food safety and food labeling
laws.
1 Multistate Outbreak of Human Salmonella Enteritidis Infections Associated with
Shell Eggs (Final Update), Ctr. For Disease Control (Dec. 2, 2010), https://www.cdc.
gov/salmonella/2010/shell-eggs-12-2-10.html.
2 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Quality Egg, Company Owner and Top Executive
Sentenced in Connection with Distribution of Adulterated Eggs (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/quality-egg-company-owner-and-top-executive-sentencedconnection-distribution-adulterated.
3 See List of Selected Outbreak Investigations Linked to Food, by Year, Ctr. For
Disease Control, https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/outbreaks.html (last visited
Oct. 1, 2018); see also Kathy Hardee, Criminal Prosecutions in the Food Industry:
Adulteration and Prison Time, FoodSafety Magazine (June 18, 2015), https://www.
foodsafetymagazine.com/enewsletter/criminal-prosecutions-in-the-food-industryadulteration-and-prison-time/.
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can do to prevent such unacceptable conditions, decrease the
likelihood and severity of an outbreak and, of course, avoid
incarceration.
The Salmonella That Sickened America
A Salmonella infection, or salmonellosis, is a dangerous and
potentially fatal disease.4 Most people with salmonellosis experience
diarrhea, stomach cramps, and fever for several days.5 The diarrhea
can be so severe that some people need to be hospitalized.6 If the
infection spreads to the bloodstream — which is more common
in people with compromised immune systems — the victim may
succumb to the illness and die.7 According to some reports, as many as
56,000 Americans were sickened during the 2010 tainted egg
outbreak.8
The Salmonella outbreak was traced back to eggs produced
by a single company based in Iowa notorious for its scoff-law tactics:
Quality Eggs, LLC.9 Faced with information tracing the contamination
back to its facilities — courtesy of sleuthing regulators10 — Quality
Egg recalled over 500 million eggs, one of the largest egg recalls
in U.S. history.11 Quality Egg pled guilty to: (1) felony bribing of
a USDA inspector; (2) felony introduction of misbranded eggs
into interstate commerce with intent to defraud and mislead, and; (3)
misdemeanor introduction of adulterated eggs into interstate
commerce.12
What is Salmonella?, Ctr. For Disease Control, https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/
general/index.html (last visited Oct 1, 2018).

4

Id.
Id.
7 Id.
8 David Pitt, Egg Executives in 2010 Salmonella Case Must Report to Prison,
The Seattle Times (June 27, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/eggexecutives-in-salmonella-case-must-report-to-prison/.
5

6

9 United States v. Quality Egg, LLC., 99 F. Supp. 3d 920, 923 (N.D. Iowa 2015), aff’d
sub nom. United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2016).
10 Quality Egg, 99 F. Supp 3d at 923 (“After the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) presented epidemiologic information to Quality Egg, the defendants voluntarily
recalled millions of dozens of eggs in 2010.”).
11 Half a Billion Eggs Have Been Recalled, CNN (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.cnn.
com/2010/HEALTH/,08/20/eggs.recall.salmonella/index.html.
12 United States v. DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.
Ct. 2160 (2017).
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The Crimes That Spread the Salmonella
The Quality Egg outbreak story is truly sensational for a
number of reasons, but especially for the company’s blatant disregard
for cleanliness and the horrid conditions of the egg-laying facilities
discovered during the FDA’s inspection. However, the case is often
only discussed from the perspective of a corporate officer wondering
if they are next to face prosecution for a food safety violation. Those
concerns are justified. Jack and Peter DeCoster, the father and son
duo who owned and managed Quality Egg, were prosecuted under a
provision of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act providing
strict liability for introducing adulterated food in interstate commerce.
21 U.S.C. §331(a).13 Other corporate officers, though not many, have
also been prosecuted under this provision as “responsible corporate
officers” of food companies.14
Following a plea deal, the DeCosters paid hefty fines and
eventually spent three months in prison.15 They were shocked by their
prison sentences (issued by Mark Bennett, District Judge for the
Northern District of Iowa) and appealed to the Eighth Circuit for
relief. The Eighth Circuit upheld the prison sentences even though the
DeCosters did not have personal knowledge that Quality Egg had
shipped adulterated eggs.16 The Eighth Circuit held the sentences did
not violate Due Process even though there was no intent element of
their misdemeanor crimes. As the court explained: “[t]he elimination
of a mens rea requirement does not violate the Due Process Clause
for a public welfare offense where the penalty is ‘relatively small,’
the conviction does not gravely damage the defendant’s reputation,
and congressional intent supports the imposition of the penalty.”17
13 Quality Egg, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 923 (“Austin “Jack” DeCoster owned and
controlled the activities of Quality Egg. Peter DeCoster, Austin DeCoster’s son, was
the Chief
Operating Officer of Quality Egg.”).

See id. at 937 (detailing two instances in which other corporate officers have been
prosecuted as “reasonable corporate officers” under 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)).

14

DeCoster, 828 F.3d at 631.
at 642.
17 Id. at 633.

15

16 Id.
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Moreover, the defendants were not convicted for the wrongs
of their subordinates; they were guilty for allowing FDCA violations
when they knew or should have known of the unsanitary conditions
that directly led to the violations.18 Though the DeCosters’ plea
agreements claimed they did not know the eggs were contaminated,
they admitted they were in positions of sufficient authority to detect,
prevent, and correct the sale of contaminated eggs had they known
about the contamination.19 Under the FDCA, this was sufficient to
make them guilty of misdemeanor crimes as responsible corporate
officers.20
The Questions We Should Be Asking to Prevent Criminal FDCA
Violations
Given these types of cases, corporate officers have reason to
be concerned about the liability risks of running and owning a food
business. Criminal strict liability for FDCA violations is a real
possibility. However, while criminal liability for c-suite executives
and quality control officers is an important concern, preventing death
and severe illness from the shipment and sale of adulterated food is a
much more important matter. The mental and physical harm incurred
from a foodborne illness can be debilitating and impose a sentence
much more severe than the three-month prison terms the DeCosters
served.
Fortunately, the goals of avoiding criminal liability and
preventing foodborne illness go hand in hand. I would suggest,
however, instead of focusing on how food executives can avoid
prosecution, food companies should ask the following question: How
can we create a culture and environment that makes food safety a top

18 Id. (“Under the FDCA… a Corporate officer is held accountable not for the acts or
omissions of others, but rater for his own failure to prevent or remedy ‘the condition
which gave rise to the charges against him.’” (quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S.
658, 675 (1975))).
19 Id. at 631.
20 Id. at 632.
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priority and encourages employees to express food safety concerns and
follow established food safety protocol?
What Practices Have Led to Outbreaks Resulting in Criminal Liability?
We can examine a handful of cases involving criminal
food safety violations in pursuit of creating a better food safety culture.
One is the case of Quality Egg LLC, mentioned above. Quality
Egg’s massive egg laying system housed upwards of 7 million
chickens which produced 5.5 million eggs a day.21 Large facilities
containing millions
of
live
animals
provide
excellent
conditions for the introduction and spread of illness.22
Preventing disease calls for extreme care.
Quality Egg engaged in the opposite. The company allowed
and created conditions that fostered the growth and spread of disease
by: (1) failing to keep live and dead rodents, frogs, and flying
insects out of their facilities; (2) failing to remove manure from the egg
laying facilities such that it filled entire rooms and burst through
facility doors; (3) failing to clean and sanitize equipment; and (4)
failing to comply with written food safety plans.23 As a result, the
Salmonella contamination spread throughout the company’s entire
facilities and pushed the company’s Salmonella presence rate nearly 40
times higher than the national rate.24 Following the criminal
investigation, the government discovered Quality Egg had also
covered up its food safety problems, thereby prolonging and
intensifying the outbreak.25 Quality Egg had falsified food safety
records, lied to its customer’s auditors about food safety measures,
Egg Recall Hits 550M, One of Largest in History, CBS News (Aug. 21, 2010), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/egg-recall-hits-550m-one-of-largest-in-history/.
22 Fiona Harvey et. al, Rise of Mega Farms: How the US Model of
Intensive Farming is Invading the World, The Guardian (July 18, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/18/rise-of-mega-farms-how-theus-model-of-intensive-farming-is-invading-the-world.
23 See DeCoster, 828 F.3d at 630-631; United States v. Quality Egg, LLC., 99 F. Supp.
3d 920, 931 (N.D. Iowa 2015).
24 DeCoster, 828 F.3d at 630.
25 Quality Egg, 99 F. Supp. 3d at 927–31.
21
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falsified packing dates on pallets of eggs, and bribed USDA
officials so it could sell inferior eggs.26
Another notorious case involves Peanut Corporation of
America (PCA). Stewart Parnell, company president, and Michael
Parnell, corporate officer, of PCA stood trial in 2014 for multiple
federal crimes stemming from shipping adulterated peanut butter and
peanut paste into interstate commerce.27 Shipping peanut products
knowingly tainted with Salmonella typhimurium earned them felony
convictions, and two decades each in prison.28 At least 714 people
were sickened by the Salmonella; at least nine people lost their lives
fighting salmonellosis infections caused by the negligent and
intentional conduct of the Parnells and PCA.29
What went wrong? Because they are grown on the ground,
peanuts are generally more susceptible to encountering pathogenic
bacteria than certain other foods.30 As such, peanut producers should
be acutely aware of the higher potential for contamination and strive to
eliminate the risk of contaminated peanuts entering commerce,
something PCA ignored. Further, since PCA was a large peanut
producer, their products were essentially everywhere. They also
supplied large amounts of product to many vulnerable populations,
including products used in school lunches, children’s snack products,
nursing homes, and hospitals.31 PCA’s process also mixed together

Id.
Moni Basu, Unprecedented Verdict: Peanut Executive Guilty in Deadly Salmonella
Outbreak, CNN (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/09/19/us/peanut-buttersalmonella-trial/index.html.
28 Moni Basu, 28 Years for Salmonella: Peanut Exec Gets Groundbreaking Sentence,
CNN, (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/09/21/us/salmonella-peanut-execsentenced/index.html.
29 Multistate Outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium Infections Linked to Peanut
Butter, 2008-2009 (FINAL UPDATE), Ctr. For Disease Control (May 11, 2009),
https://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/2009/peanut-butter-2008-2009.html.
30 See How Peanuts Grow, Nat’l Peanut Board, http://www.nationalpeanutboard.
org/peanut-info/how-peanuts-grow.htm (“Unlike most plants, the peanut plant
flowers above the ground, but fruits below ground.”) (last visited Sept. 19, 2018);
see also K. Annabelle Smith, Why Peanut Butter is the Perfect Home for
Salmonella, Smithsonian, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/why-peanutbutter-is-the-perfect-home-for-salmonella-149834812/ (explaining that because
peanuts grow on the ground, they “can be contaminated from a variety of sources:
manure, water, wild animals—even the soil.”).
31 Elizabeth Weise, Peanut Butter Probe Expands; Kellogg Recalls Products, ABC
News, https://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=6668758&page=1 (last visited Oct.
3, 2018).
26
27
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many peanuts in its facility, so contamination on one peanut could
easily be spread to other peanuts, especially if equipment was not
sanitized after each lot of product produced (which, in PCA’s case, it
was not).
These facts — which are not in themselves FDCA violations
— combined together allowed the following potentially dangerous
food safety conditions: (1) initial contamination of the peanuts was
possible before harvest because of the peanuts’ contact with soil, water
and rodents;32 (2) cross-contamination in the facility was almost
assured because the peanuts were mixed together and blended into
pastes and butter;33 and (3) because much of the product was sold to
entities making product for schools, the sick, and the elderly,34 there
was a greater possibility for more severe illnesses. Like the DeCosters,
however, the Parnells ignored these heightened risks and did the exact
opposite of what they should have done: they created conditions that
led to a widespread outbreak of foodborne illness.
Beyond these conditions, the Parnells’ negligence also
included: (1) failing to fix leaky roofs that allowed potentially
contaminated water to enter production facilities;35 (2) failing to
validate roasting conditions to properly conduct the bacteria kill step;36
(3) failing to ensure adequate pest control, allowing for rodents and
other pests to enter the facility and spread disease;37 (4) failing to use
proper cleaning devices and failing to sanitize equipment;38 and (5)
leaving product uncovered in facilities, among other regulatory
misconduct.39
Smith, supra note 30.
See Christine Lagorio, FDA Pumps Up Peanut Investigation, CBS News (Jan. 21,
2009), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fda-pumps-up-peanut-investigation/.
34 Weise, supra note 31.
35 Paul Leighton, Mass Salmonella Poisoning by the Peanut Corporation of
America: State-Corporate Crime Involving Food Safety, 24 Critical Criminology
75, 79 (July 9, 2015), http://www.paulsjusticepage.com/library/PeanutCorpMassSalmonellaPoisoning.pdf.
36 Id. at 80.
37 Id.
38 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Hum. Serv., Inspectional Observation 2 (2009),
https://www.marlerblog.com/uploads/file/Blakely%20GA%20Form%20483.pdf.
39 Id. at 3.
32
33
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PCA and the Parnells also engaged in a cover-up conspiracy
that prolonged the outbreak and prevented customers and the
government from taking action to halt its spread.40 The cover-up
included: (1) instructing company employees to ship product before
the Salmonella test results were received by the company;41 (2)
knowingly shipping Salmonella tainted peanut product to customers;42
(3) shipping numerous lots of peanut product with falsified certificates
of analysis so customers believed they were receiving product that met
their microbial specifications when, in fact, they were not;43 (4) failing
to inform customers of positive test results received after the product
had shipped;44 (5) shipping product without conducting any microbial
testing at all, yet representing that testing had been completed;45
(6) re-testing a product that had tested positive for Salmonella until
that product tested negative, then shipping the product with only
the negative test report;46 and (7) continuing to produce product in a
plant that PCA knew had produced contaminated product every year
dating back to 2003.47 Given this background, it is easy to see how the
Parnells earned their prison sentences.
Another cautionary tale involves Jensen Farms. The Jensen
Brothers, owners and operators of Jensen Farms, set the record for the
deadliest foodborne illness outbreak in the U.S. since the early 1900s.48
Not an easy feat. All told 33 people died and approximately 150 were
sickened from eating cantaloupe tainted with Listeria monocytogenes
See Basu, supra note 27.
Gardiner Harris, Peanut Products Sent Out Before Tests, New York Times (Feb. 11,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/health/policy/12peanut.html.
42 United States v. Parnell, 723 F. App’x 745, 747 (11th Cir. 2018).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Feds: Peanut plant linked to deadly outbreak faked salmonella results, CBS News
(Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/feds-peanut-plant-linked-to-deadlyoutbreak-faked-salmonella-results/.
48 Dan Flynn, The 10 Deadliest Outbreaks in U.S. History — Revisited, Food
Safety News (Apr. 4, 2012), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/04/the-tendeadliest-outbreaks-in-history-revisited/.
40
41

2018]

A Meticulous Food Safety Plan

279

produced and sold by the Jensens in late 2011.49 Listeria is one
of the most virulent foodborne pathogens and is particularly
dangerous for the immune-compromised and developing fetuses.50
According to the CDC, the fatality rate for people who develop
listeriosis as a result of infection with Listeria is 21%.51
What caused this cantaloupe outbreak? Listeria bacteria
is found in soil, water, and some animals.52 Cantaloupes are more
susceptible to Listeria contamination than fruits growing off the
ground because they grow on the ground and have significant contact
with soil and water.53 Listeria can also live in processing plants, as
a resident bacteria.54 The Jensens failed to take this heightened risk
into account by not properly preparing their packing and storage
facilities to address potential contamination. The primary culprit in
spreading the Listeria bacteria was one piece of equipment — a used
potato washing machine bought immediately before the outbreak.55 It
was not thoroughly cleaned and thus harbored the Listeria bacteria.56
Further, the manner in which the cantaloupes were cooled, stored, and
transported after harvest may have contributed to the Listeria growth.57
The Jensens were convicted of the same crime as the DeCosters, but
Multistate Outbreak of Listeriosis Linked to Whole Cantaloupes from Jensen Farms,
Colorado (FINAL UPDATE), Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention (Aug. 27,
2012), https://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/cantaloupes-jensen-farms/index.html.
50 See generally Listeria (Listeriosis), Ctr. for Disease Control and
Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/listeria/ (providing information on Listeria and how
the illness it causes, listeriosis, affects the United States’ population) (last updated June
29, 2017) .
51 Samson P. Baba, DDS, et al., Vital Signs: Listeria Illnesses, Deaths, and Outbreaks
— United States, 2009–2011, 62 Ctr. for Disease Control Morbidity and Mortality
Wkly. Rep. 432, 448–49 (2013), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6222.pdf.
52 U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., Listeria, FoodSafety.gov, https://
www.foodsafety.gov/poisoning/causes/bacteriaviruses/listeria/index.html
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Listeria—DHHS].
53 Produce Indus. Food Safety Initiative, Commodity Specific Food Safety
Guidelines for the Melon Supply Chain 4 (2005), https://www.fda.gov/downloads/
food/guidanceregulation/ucm168625.pdf.
54 Listeria—DHHS, supra note 52.
55 Eric And Ryan Jensen Plead Guilty To All Counts Of Introducing Tainted Cantaloupe
Into Interstate Commerce, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice (Oct. 22, 2013), https://www.justice.
gov/usao-co/pr/eric-and-ryan-jensen-plead-guilty-all-counts-introducing-taintedcantaloupe-interstate.
49

56 Id.
57 Id.
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for clearly less egregious conduct.58 The Jensens were ordered to pay
restitution, perform community service, were sentenced to five years’
probation and six months home detention.59
The lessons
What are the lessons corporate officers can learn from these
cases? The primary point, according to the foremost expert in food
safety litigation, Bill Marler, is: “there was always an opportunity to
fix the problem before it blew up.”60 This is true in all of the
outbreaks explored in this article and likely true of every other major
foodborne illness outbreak in the United States. The lesson should be to
have a food safety system in place for finding and maximizing on
those opportunities. On a more microscopic level, the primary lessons
from these criminal cases are fairly obvious:
● Don’t engage in fraudulent conduct (e.g., falsifying testing
reports or changing production date stamps) and don’t tacitly
encourages others to do so.
● Don't knowingly ship or sell contaminated product.
● Don’t bribe or otherwise attempt to manipulate regulators.
● Don’t create conditions that foster spread of disease by, for
example, storing product in open containers or allowing rodents
and other vermin easy access to your facility.
● Create, and then follow, a FSMA-compliant food safety plan.
● Immediately fix a food safety violation when you uncover it.

Compare Plea Agreement for Eric Jensen, United States. v. Jensen, No. 13mj-01138 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2013) (finding Eric and Ryan Jensen knowingly
distributed adulterated cantelope in interstate commerce), with United States v.
DeCoster, 828 F.3d 626, 631 (8th Cir. 2016) (showing Mr. Decoster plead guilty to: (1)
bribing a USDA inspector, (2) intentionally introducing misbranded eggs into
interstate commerce, and (3) introducing adulterated eggs into commerce).
59 Mary Beth Marklein, Cantelope farmers get no prison time in disease outbreak,
USA Today (Jan. 28, 2014), https://usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/01/28/
sentencing-of-colorado-cantaloupe-farmers/4958671/.
60 Bill Marler, Managing Partner, Marler Clark, Lecture in Food Safety Litigation
Course at the Univ. of Ark. Sch. of Law (Spring 2017).
58
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However, these measures are no-brainers and things your
company is hopefully already doing. So what else can we discern from
these cases about foodborne illness prevention that is not immediately
obvious and may help create a more meaningful food safety program?
Here are some ideas:
1. Create a food safety first culture. A food safety first
culturecan make all the difference in preventing or lessening the
severity of an outbreak. Food safety was not part of PCA’s company
culture. Employees were routinely instructed to ship contaminated
product and to “just ship” product without receiving test results
because the Parnells did not want to lose a customer.61 The Parnells
maintained a company-wide culture of indifference and indignation to
food safety measures.62 In contrast to the Parnells, food companies
should ensure the company culture has a strong, primary focus on
food safety which includes ensuring all employees feel comfortable
reporting potential food safety violations, no matter how trivial they
may appear. Companies should consider incentives and rewards for
employees who identify and fix food safety errors. Moreover,
company policy should instruct that each employee is responsible for,
and must take ownership of, the safety of all food products under his
or her control. Management should likewise take responsibility for,
and ownership of, food safety products under control of his or her
subordinates. Food safety should be a source of company and
employee pride.
2. Do not ignore your own internal food safety research. The
1993 Jack-in-the-Box E-coli outbreak could have been prevented if
the company had simply followed the advice and research of its own
employees.63 In that case, internal studies showed that increasing
cooking time by a couple of minutes would have reduced the

61 Answering Brief of the United States at 18, United States v. Parnell, 723 F. Appx.
745 (2018) (No. 15-14400), 2017 WL 780905 at 18.
62 Id. at 13.
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E- coli colonies in burgers sufficient to ensure they could be safety
consumed.64 Jack-in-the-Box management ignored one employee’s
suggestion to increase cook time and, instead, reminded the employee
of the obligation to follow the existing company cooking-time
policies.65 Had they taken up the suggestion instead, the outbreak
could have been prevented.
3. Have measurable and meaningful pathogen-reduction goals.
In ready-to-eat foods, the goal for positive pathogen testing should, of
course, be zero. Likewise, for per-se adulterants (e.g., E-coli
0157:H7), zero tolerance is the measure.66 However, where the USDA
or FDA has not declared a pathogen a per se adulterant, companies
should set strict and challenging microbial level goals. For example,
Wal-Mart has undertaken significant efforts to reduce the presence of
Salmonella in its raw chicken by placing strict pathogen requirements
on its chicken parts suppliers.67 Wal-Mart has also implemented
a testing regime for the raw chicken it purchases. As a result, the
company has had a significant decrease in Salmonella presence in its
raw chicken.68
4. Know where your skeletons are. That is, understand the
risks most likely associated with your product and create — then
follow — an individual risk mitigation plan for those specific risks.
There are some food products that commonly carry pathogens;

63 Elaine Porterfield & Adam Berliant, Jack in the Box Ignored Safety Rules, News
Tribune (Takoma, WA) (June 16, 1995), https://about-ecoli.com/ecoli_outbreaks/
news/jack-in-the-box-ignored-safety-rules.
64 Id.
65 See id. (noting the company’s answer to an employee’s concern about undercooked
burgers, which stated that “if patties are cooked longer, they become tough.”).
66 See Texas Food Indus. Ass’n v. Espy, 870 F. Supp. 143, 149 (W.D. Tex. 1994)
(affirming declaration of e-coli of a per se adulterant in raw ground beef under the
Federal Meat Inspection Act).
67 See Walmart, Food Safety Requirement for Food and Beverage Suppliers
12–13 (2017), https://cdn.corporate.walmart.com/3d/b3/f30fc5f44fc58ea06cec84102c26/
supplier-food-safety-requirements-2017-v2.pdf (outlining food safety procedures for
poultry suppliers).
68 Coral Beach, Wal-Mart’s chicken safety program shows significant results, Food
Safety News (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/08/130453/.
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poultry is known to carry Salmonella bacteria,69 beef is known to carry
E-coli bacteria,70 and ready-to-eat deli meat is known to carry Listeria
bacteria.71 Companies selling these products, therefore, should test for
these pathogens and create a pathogen-reduction and control program
specific to those risks as a part of FSMA compliance. For example,
given the 2017 widespread outbreak of E-coli illness from romaine
lettuce grown near Yuma, AZ, food companies planning
to source produce from that region should take caution to protect
against contamination. The outbreak was traced to an irrigation ditch
downstream from a concentrated cattle feeding operation and upstream
from the romaine fields; the source of the E-coli, therefore, may still
be lingering upstream from the produce fields.72
5. Invest in traceability measures and consider blockchain
technology. Food giants like Wal-Mart view blockchain technology as
the answer to stopping or slowing down food-related pathogen
outbreaks.73 Regulations require a one-forward, one-back traceability
system, but as we saw in the recent E.coli outbreak, this approach may
not be sufficient to initiate a product recall or swiftly trace the source
of the pathogen. It took months for the CDC and FDA to

69 Chicken and food poisoning, Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, https://
www.cdc.gov/features/salmonellachicken/index.html (noting that “Chicken can be a
nutritious choice, but raw chicken is often contaminated with Campylobacter bacteria
and sometimes with Salmonella and Clostridium perfringens bacteria”) (last updated
Sept. 20, 2018).
70 U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs, E-coli, FoodSafety.Gov, https://www.
foodsafety.gov/poisoning/causes/bacteriaviruses/ecoli/index.html (last visited Oct. 2,
2018).
71 Listeria, supra note 51.
72 U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs, FDA Investigating Multistate Outbreak
of E. coli O157:H7 Infections Linked to Romaine Lettuce from Yuma Growing
Region, U.S. Food and Drug Admin (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/
food/recallsoutbreaksemergencies/outbreaks/ucm604254.htm.
73 Camila Russo, Walmart Is Getting Suppliers to Put Food on the Blockchain,
Bloomberg (Apr. 23, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2018-04-23/walmart-is-getting-suppliers-to-put-food-on-blockchain-to-track.
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trace the tainted romaine lettuce back to a grower.74 In the meantime,
grocery stores were pulling all romaine products off their shelves and
consumers were avoiding consumption of any and all romaine
lettuce.75 The outbreak could have ended sooner and companies could
have wasted fewer resources had the supply chain been better
documented through blockchain or other technology. Blockchain
technology can assist with more than traceability, it can also help
companies identify any weakness in their supply chain since it can be
used to automatically track temperatures, shipment dates, delivery
dates, currency of safety certificates, and other information critical to
maintaining a safe and secure supply chain.76 As part of your
traceability program, conduct mock recalls and audits to ensure your
traceability system will function if necessary.
6. Take immediate action to notify customers of a recall.
In other words, don’t wait until the close of markets on a Friday
afternoon to notify your retailers of a recall. This common practice is a
dead giveaway you are putting profits ahead of food safety and may
ruin your relationships with business partners.
7. Overtrain employees on food safety and do it in their native
language. Research shows people only retain 20% of what they hear.77
Repetition can significantly increase this number, so employees must
be trained and trained again (critically, in their native language) on
proper food safety measures.

Julia Jacobs, Officials Identify a Source in the Roamine Lettuce E. Coli Outbreak,
N.Y. Times (July 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/01/us/romainelettuce-e-coli-nyt.html.
75 Jesse Hirsch, Stores Pulling Romaine Lettuce Off Shelves Amid E. Coli Outbreak,
Consumer reports (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/e-coli/storespulling-romaine-lettuce-off-shelves-amid-e-coli-outbreak/.
76 Bernard Marr, How Blockchain Will Transform The Supply Chain And
Logistics Industry, Forbes (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bernardmarr/2018/03/23/how-blockchain-will-transform-the-supply-chain-andlogistics-industry/#6de4d315fecd.
77 Will Thalheimer, Debunk This: People Remember 10 Percent of What They Read,
Ass’n for Talent Dev. (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.td.org/insights/debunk-thispeople-remember-10-percent-of-what-they-read.
74
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Conclusions
In sum, following a food safety plan is essential to achieve
food safety goals, prevent widespread and lingering outbreaks, ensure
regulatory compliance, and avoid incarceration. Going one step further
and engaging employees, creating a healthy food safety culture, and
installing numerous check points can create brand loyalty, customer
loyalty, and hopefully prevent any illness from occurring at all. Simply
put, if food companies put food safety first, the results will follow.

Super Unleaded Malbec? A Case Study in Flawed
International Standard Setting at the Codex Alimentarius
Justin Schwegel*
I. Introduction
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS
Agreement) provides rules on the adoption and enforcement of SPS
measures. It also presumes that food safety regulations adopted by
WTO Members that conform to relevant international standards are
consistent with the SPS Agreement.1 The relevant international
standard setting body for food safety is the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, which conducts most of its food safety risk
management work through subsidiary bodies such as the Codex
Committee on Contaminants in Food (CCCF). CCCF establishes
maximum limits for food contaminants and codes of practice for
reducing food contamination.2 These subsidiary bodies in turn
delegate risk management work to electronic working groups
(EWG that are comprised of relevant food safety authorities of Codex
member states.3
One contaminant of concern is lead. Lead exposure from
dietary sources is harmful to human health, and especially harmful to
children.4 In March 2018, the CCCF Electronic Working Group (EWG)
*Justin Schwegel holds law degrees from Georgetown University Law Center and
Sciences Po Paris and is a 2019 candidate in the University of Arkansas’s Agriculture
and Food Law LL.M. Program. He specializes in international trade, food safety and
economic development.
1Agreement on the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 3.2, April 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33
I.L.M. 1125, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm [hereinafter SPS
Agreement].
2 Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Procedural Manual, Twenty-Fourth Edition, at 192
(2015), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5079e.pdf [hereinafter Codex Manual].
3 Id. at 109–11.
4 Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives, Evaluation of Certain
Food Additives and Contaminants, Seventy-Third Report, WHO Technical Report
Series 960, at 176 (2010), http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/44515 [hereinafter
Evaluation].
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to Revise the Maximum Levels (ML) for Lead proposed to reduce the
ML for lead in wine from .2 parts per million (ppm)5 to .05 ppm.6
The EWG ostensibly based this proposal on the “ALARA” principle,
which dictates that standards for dangerous contaminants should be
set at a level “as low as reasonably achievable.”7 The EWG applies
the same methodology when establishing MLs for relatively lowvalue products often consumed by children, the group most vulnerable
to lead exposure.8 Another EWG is currently charged with
prioritizing commodities to establish new lead MLs in the General
Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and Feed.9 Some
commodities under consideration include high value, age-restricted
products like cognac and absinthe.10 Establishing MLs for alcoholic
beverages using the methodology applied to products marketed for
child consumption is inappropriate. It could also distract from the
important work of progressively reducing lead in products commonly
consumed by those most vulnerable to lead exposure, where
reductions in lead provide greater public health benefit for the same
economic cost.
II. The GATT, the WTO, and the Internationalization of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards

Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Codex General Standard for Contaminants
and Toxins in Food and Feed, Codex Standard 193-1995, at 46 (2018), www.fao.org/
input/download/standards/17/CXS_193e_2015.pdf.
6 Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Proposed Draft and Draft Maximum Levels of Lead in
Selected Commodities in the General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and
Feed, CX/CF 18/12/5, at 5 (2018), http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/shproxy/en/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsite s%
252Fcodex%252FMeetings%252FCX-735-12%252FWD%252Fcf12_05e.pdf
[hereinafter Codex Draft].
7 Id. at 8.
8 See Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., supra note 6, at 8.
9 Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Discussion Paper on Future Work on Maximum Levels
for Lead for Inclusion in the General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food
and Feed, CX/CF 18/12/14 (2018), http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/shproxy/en/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsites%252
Fcodex%252FMeetings%252FCX-735-12%252FWD%252Fcf12_14e.pdf [hereinafter
Codex Discussion Paper].
10 Id. at 29.
5
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A. The Need for International Standard Setting Bodies
The WTO Members negotiated greater trade liberalization
at the Uruguay Round, particularly for agricultural commodities.11
The SPS Agreement was designed to help ensure this trade
liberalization was not undermined by unnecessarily restrictive SPS
measures.12 An SPS measure under the terms of the SPS Agreement
is any measure adopted to protect human, animal, or plant life or
health from disease, or unsafe food and feed.13 While necessary to
protect both human health and the security of the food supply, such
measures can also be applied in such a way as to function as nontariff
barriers to trade in agricultural products.14
Prior to the adoption of the SPS Agreement, sanitary
and phytosanitary (SPS) measures were only subject to Article XX
(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT.15 GATT
Article XX(b provides general exceptions for the application of
potentially trade-restrictive measures “necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health.”16 This proved an ineffective
regulatory structure.17 It neither effectively disciplined protectionist
SPS measures nor sufficiently recognized Members’ sovereign right
See Boris Rigod, The Purpose of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), 24 Eur. J. Int’l L. 503, 507 (2013).
12 Id.; see also Marie Denise Prévost, Balancing Trade and Health in the SPS
Agreement: The Development Dimension 481–82 (2009) (discussing the purpose
behind the Uruguay Round negotiations of the SPS Agreement and trade disputes
concerning market access barriers to agricultural products).
13 SPS Agreement, supra note 1, at Annex A1.
14 See Renée Johnson, Cong. Research Serv., 7-5700, Sanitary and Phytosanitary
(SPS) and Related Non-Tariff Barriers to Agricultural Trade 22, 33 (2014)
(discussing concerns from agricultural exporters and policy makers that SPS measures
act as nontariff barriers).
15 While the 1979 GATT “Standards Code” applied among states that ratified it, it
was not generally applicable to all GATT members. Additionally, its substantive and
procedural deficiencies rendered it ineffective even for states party to the agreement.
See Prévost, supra note 12, at 470-481 (discussing numerous shortcomings of the
“Standards Code”).
16 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
55 U.N.T.S. 194, 262 [hereinafter GATT]; see also, Appellate Body Report, United
States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶¶147–51, WTO
Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) (explaining that measures adopted
under the specific exceptions enumerated under GATT Article XX must also comply
with the language of the chapeau).
17 See Prévost, supra note 12, at 474 (discussing the lack of enforceability of the art.
XX(b) exceptions).
11
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to adopt legitimate SPS measures.18 Additionally, under GATT Article
XX, WTO Members were not obligated to avoid arbitrarily applying
different levels of sanitary and phytosanitary protection in comparable
situations.19
The myriad insufficiencies of the existing framework governing
the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures led GATT
negotiators to begin negotiating an agreement that would explicitly
articulate contracting parties’ right to adopt legitimate SPS measures
and subject such measures to strict disciplines to avoid protectionism.20
Namely, they must be based on a scientific assessment of risk or the
relevant international standard.21 The SPS Agreement cites three
international standard setting bodies of reference, including the Codex
Alimentarius mentioned above.22 The World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC
are the relevant international standard setting bodies for animal health
and plant health respectively.23
When WTO Members adopt uniform international SPS
standards it reduces the cost of regulatory compliance for exporters.24
This facilitates international trade.25 Codex, IPPC and OIE are open to
membership from WTO Members and were perceived at the time of
negotiations to establish standards on a sound scientific basis by the
parties negotiating the text of the SPS Agreement.26 As a result, the
negotiating parties supported deference to the standards promulgated
18 Id.

Id.; but see SPS Agreement, art. 5(5) (containing such an obligation).
SPS Agreement, supra note 1; See also, Rigod, supra note 11, at 507.
21 SPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 3, art. 5.
22 Id. at Annex A(3).
23 Id. at Annex A(3)(b), (c).
24 See Prévost, supra note 12, at 317.
25 See e.g., Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., supra note 2, at 21.
26 See e.g., Negotiating Group on Agriculture, Communication from Israel Expressing
Views on Certain Elements in the Negotiation on Agriculture, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/153, at
5 (Feb. 13, 1990) (stressing the importance of science based standards and
supporting the adoption of standards developed in the international standard setting
bodies as guidelines for an effective surveillance and dispute settlement procedure in
GATT), https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/.%5CUR%5CGNGNG05%5CW153.PDF; WTO
Negotiating Group on Agriculture, Supplementary Communication from the Cairns
Group, at ¶19, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/164 (Apr. 18, 1990), https://docs.google. com/
document/d/1vYmqLiHdwlu2PLPWr3ZfhfCtlgc48a6ZcDsCgPX2PNo/edit.
19

20
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by these bodies.27 This deference creates a presumption that an
SPS measure that complies with the relevant international standard
also complies with the SPS Agreement and Article XX(b) of the
GATT.28 Early proposals by negotiating parties such as the United
States and the Cairns group suggested that SPS measures conforming
to international standards should be “deemed” consistent with
WTO obligations rather than deemed necessary and “presumed”
consistent.29 While a presumption of consistency can be rebutted, it
seems unlikely a measure “deemed” consistent with the SPS
Agreement could be shown to be nonetheless inconsistent.30
B. The Use of Codex Standards
WTO Members have several incentives to adopt
international standards. Because many developing WTO Members
lack the capacity to conduct risk assessments of their own they often
defer to Codex’s food safety standards.31 This is often done
through regulations that either explicitly defer to Codex or
mirror Codex standards.32 Additionally, because the SPS
Agreement presumes measures that conform to international
standards are consistent with the Agreement there is a safe harbor
27

Id.

SPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 3(2) (“Sanitary or phytosanitary
measures which conform to international standards, guidelines or recommendations
shall be . . . presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this
Agreement and of GATT 1994.”).
29 Negotiating Group on Agriculture, supra note 26; Negotiating Group on
Agriculture, Submission of the United States on Comprehensive Long-Term
Agriculture Reform, MTN.GNG/NG5/W/118, at 12 (Oct. 25, 1989),
https:www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92080128.pdf.
30 While beyond the scope of this article, the negotiating history eschewing
an irrebuttable presumption of WTO consistency in favor of presumed
consistency does not provide great clarity as to when a measure adopted by a
WTO Member in accordance with an international standard can nonetheless be
deemed WTO inconsistent. Likely, the adoption of international standards that fail to
comply with the requirement to avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in
applying an appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection in different
situations under Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement could be considered arbitrary and
unjustifiable under Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement and the chapeau of
GATT Article XX.
31 See Kimberly Berry, Codex MRLs—Use and Trends 1 (2006), https://www.
globalmrl.com/downloads/whitepaper_Codex_MRLs_Use_and_Trends_globalmrl.
pdf.
32 Id.
28 See
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for regulations harmonized with the international standard.33 WTO
Members are less likely to challenge SPS measures that are
consistent with international standards because of the greater burden
of overcoming the presumed consistency.34 Because of this safe
harbor, many WTO Members either defer to the Codex when there is
no domestic standard (as Morocco does for veterinary drug residues, for
example)35 or allow imports that comply with international standards
notwithstanding a more restrictive domestic standard (as South Africa
does for pesticide residues, for example).36
Due to the widespread adoption of Codex standards and the
deference they are given under the SPS Agreement, their importance
for international trade is difficult to overstate. Consequently, the
potential for negative economic impacts from overly restrictive Codex
standards has been a real concern for many agricultural producers in the
past.37 The Codex Alimentarius Committee on Contaminants in Food
(CCCF) is the Codex committee responsible for establishing MLs for
SPS Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 3(2).
See Standards and Safety, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/agrm4_e.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2018).
35 Aziz AKHANNOUCH & Anass DOUKKALI, “Arrêté du ministre de la santé n
°2454-17 du 3 joumada II 1439 (20 février 2018) fixant les limites
maximales autorisées de résidus des produits pharmaceutiques dans les produits
primaires et les produits alimentaires,” Bulletin Officiel, 2018, no. 6666, p. 1029,
http://www.sgg.gov.ma/BO/FR/2018/BO_6666_Fr.pdfver=2018-04-27-113812-017,
translated in GLOB. AGRIC. INFO. NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
GAIN REP. NO. MO1826, MOROCCO, VETERINARY DRUG MRLS
ESTABLISHED, 2 (2018), https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%
20Publications/Veterinary%20Drug%20MRLs%20
Established_Rabat_Morocco_6-6-2018.pdf (deferring to Codex Alimentarius
maximum residue limits (MRL) for veterinary drugs when no domestic
MRL has been established).
36 Dep’t of Nat’l Health & Population Dev., Regulations Governing the Maximum
Limits for Pesticide Residues That May Be Present in Foodstuffs, GN R.246 of 11
February 1994, at 2(d) (11 Feb 1994), https://www.nda.agric.za/docs/PlantQuality/
quality%20control/MRLs%20Dept%20of%20Health%20-%20R246%20of%20 11%
20Feb%201994.pdf (allowing the import of foodstuffs that comply with Codex
Alimentarius standards for pesticides).
37 See, e.g., Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Proposed Draft Maximum Level for Aflatoxins
in Ready-to-Eat Peanuts and Associated Sampling Plans (at Step 4), CX/CF 18/12/10Add.1, at 2-4, (Mar. 12-16, 2018), http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/
sh-proxy/pt/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsites%
252Fcodex%252FMeetings%252FCX-735-12%252FWD%252Fcf12_10_Add1e.pdf
(noting the United States and the International Council of Grocery Manufacturers
Associations concerns that an overly restrictive ML for aflatoxins in ready-to-eat
peanuts would cause potentially significant problems with international trade).
33

34
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contaminants, such as lead, in food and beverages.38
Several wine producing countries have likewise expressed
concern about the low ML for lead in wine proposed by CCCF’s EWG
to revise MLs for lead.39
III. The Health Concern over Lead Exposure and the Codex
Response
Exposure to lead from food is harmful to everyone, but it
is disproportionately harmful to children.40 As a result of a 2010
study on lead exposure, a new Codex electronic working group was
established to reconsider international standards regarding maximum
levels of lead allowed in food products, especially for products
consumed by children.41 EWGs are subject to the Codex guidelines
on risk management recommendations.42 These guidelines require risk
management recommendations to be based on an approach that weighs
the economic cost against the public health benefit.43
A. The Special Vulnerability of Children to Lead Exposure
In 2010, the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food
Additives (JECFA) held its 73rd meeting to evaluate certain food
additives and contaminants.44 The JECFA meeting report cited concerns
Codex Manuel, supra note 2, at 192.
See Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Proposed Draft and Draft Maximum Levels
of Lead in Selected Commodities in the General Standard for Contaminants and
Toxins in Food and Feed (CXS 193-1995) (at Steps 7 and 4), CX/CF 18/12/5-Add.1, at
1-7 (March 12–16, 2018), http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/sh-proxy/
en/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsites%252Fcod ex
%252FMeetings%252FCX-735-12%252FWD%252Fcf12_05_Add1e.pdf (noting
comments from Argentina, Australia, Japan, and Turkey that show such concern).
40 Evaluation, supra note 4, at 176.
41 Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Rep. of the Fifth Session of the Codex Committee on
Contaminants in Foods, REP11/CF, at 15 (2011), www.fao.org/input/download/
report/758/REP11_CFe.pdf.
42 Codex Manuel, supra note 2, at 129.
43 See id. at 128 (noting that the CCCF shall consider, among other factors, protection
of consumer health and the impact on international trade when preparing its priority
list of substances for review).
44 Evaluation, supra note 4.
38
39
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over lead exposure and noted it was impossible to establish a tolerable
weekly intake for lead that would be health protective.45 Essentially,
JECFA found that no level of lead exposure is safe. JECFA noted, “[b]
ecause of the neurodevelopmental effects, fetuses, infants and children
are the subgroups that are most sensitive to lead.”46 While they are the
most vulnerable, children are not the only group at risk of harmful
health impacts from dietary exposure to lead. The greatest concern from
lead exposure for adults is an associated risk of increased systolic blood
pressure, though JECFA has found this concern is not as significant as
the concern for the neurodevelopmental impact on children.47 JECFA
also noted:
impaired neurodevelopment in children is generally
associated with lower blood lead concentrations than the other
effects, the weight of evidence is greater for neurodevelopmental
effects than for other health effects and the results across studies
are more consistent than those for other effects.48
JECFA’s case for reducing children’s dietary exposure to lead
was strong. As a result of the JECFA report, the Codex Alimentarius
Committee on Contaminants in Food (CCCF) established an electronic
working group to reconsider the existing lead maximum levels with a
focus on reducing dietary exposure to lead, especially for infants and
children.49
The discussion paper presented at the following CCCF meeting
by the EWG stressed the importance of “whether children were
high consumers of the food or had significant lead exposure from the
food, since lead is of particular concern for children.”50
Id. at 176.
Id. at 481.
47 Id. at 480.
48 Id.
49 Codex Alimentarius Comm’n, Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme,
REP12/CF, at ¶ 116 (Mar.26-30,2012),http://www.fao.org/input/download/
report/776/REP12_CFe.pdf (stating that the EWG was established to “(i)
reconsider the existing maximum levels with a focus on foods important for infants
and children and also on the canned fruits and vegetables and (ii) reconsider if other
existing maximum levels should be addressed”).
50 Id. at ¶ 116 (stressing throughout the discussion paper the importance of the rate
at which children consume various foods and the relative additional protection a
lower ML would provide to children who are particularly vulnerable to lead
exposure).
45

46
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Concerns over the dietary exposure of children and fetuses to
lead were a primary reason the EWG was established.51 The EWG’s
original mandate to “focus on foods important for infants and children”
reflects CCCF’s u nderstanding o f t he r elative r isks f or different
population groups.52 By committing to prioritize lead MLs for foods
consumed by the most vulnerable group in its early reconsideration of
MLs in the General Standard, CCCF recognized the greater relative risk
to children from dietary lead exposure identified in the JECFA report.
B. Risk Assessment, Risk Management, Codex Guidelines, and
the Inherent Need for Proportionality
Under the Codex Alimentarius Working Principles there is a
clear distinction between the competences of the body charged with risk
assessment, the FAO/WHO joint expert bodies, and the body charged
with risk management, the Codex Alimentarius Commission and its
subsidiary bodies.53 For contaminants it is JECFA’s responsibility
to assess risk, while CCCF is the subsidiary Codex risk
management body.54
When managing risk through the propagation of
international standards, Codex has the dual mandate of
“protecting consumers’ health and ensuring fair practices in the
food trade.”55 The dual mandate reflects the language of the
original 1961 FAO resolution calling for the establishment of the
Codex Alimentarius Commission, which recognized the importance
of international food standards for “protecting consumer[s] and
producer[s] in all countries.”56 The need to balance the economic
costs of disrupted trade with the anticipated public health benefits of
See Report of the Fifth Session of the Codex on Contaminants in Foods, REP11/CF,
at 15, Joint FAO/WHO (2011) (stating that the EWG was established to “(i)
reconsider the existing maximum levels with a focus on foods important for infants
and children and also on the canned fruits and vegetables and (ii) reconsider if
other existing maximum levels should be addressed.”).
52 Id.
53 See Codex Manual, supra note 2, at 126–29.
54 See id. at 127.
55 Id. at 116.
56 See Codex Alimentarius Comm’n. Res. 12/61 (Nov. 4–24, 1961) (creating the Codex
Alimentarius Commission generally, and including reasons for its creation).
51
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a given food safety standard is not unique to Codex; it is inherent in
any food regulatory system.57
The relevant Codex risk management body for contaminants
in food is CCCF.58 The Codex Alimentarius Commission’s Procedural
Manual establishes guidelines for how CCCF is to make its risk
management recommendations.59 There are three guidelines in the
Procedural Manual that are especially relevant to the consideration of
MLs for lead in different commodities. The recommendations must
be based on the JECFA risk assessments, they must take
different consumption patterns and dietary exposures into account,
and they must be based on principles established in the Codex
General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and Feed.60
With respect to the first guideline, JECFA assessed the risk
posed by lead.61 It recommended that in populations with prolonged
dietary exposures the relevant food safety authorities should take
measures “to identify major contributing sources and foods and…
to identify methods of reducing dietary exposure commensurate with
the level of risk reduction [emphasis added].”62 The recommendation
to pursue means of reducing dietary exposure commensurate with risk
reduction reflects the balancing of economic costs and public health
benefits inherent in food safety regulation. Put differently, the EWG
should ensure the public health benefit of the end justifies the
economic cost of the means.63
The Codex guideline requiring that different consumption
patterns and dietary exposures be taken into account is important for
determining the expected health benefit of a food safety standard.64
See generally Jᴇᴀɴ C. Bᴜᴢʙʏ, ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ.,U.S Dᴇᴘ’ᴛ. Aɢʀɪᴄ., ERS, Iɴᴛᴇʀɴᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Tʀᴀᴅᴇ
ᴀɴᴅ Fᴏᴏᴅ Sᴀꜰᴇᴛʏ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍɪᴄ Tʜᴇᴏʀʏ ᴀɴᴅ Cᴀsᴇ Sᴛᴜᴅɪᴇs 828, 29 (2003) (discussing the
ineluctable necessity to balance economic interests with food safety concerns).
57

Codex Manual, supra note 2, at 192.
Id. at 129–30.
60 Id.
61 Evaluation, supra note 4, at 162–77.
62 Id. at 177.
63 See generally Bᴜᴢʙʏ, ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 57 (discussing the balance of food safety and
economic concerns in food safety policy making).
64 See generally Codex Manual, supra note 2, at 132–35 (describing in detail the
CCCF policy for conducting exposure assessments of contaminants and toxins in food
or food groups).
58

59
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If the most vulnerable populations will not ordinarily be exposed to
lead from alcoholic beverages this should be taken into account when
assessing the public health benefit of a new ML. Early work of the
EWG seems to have taken this into account as many of the commodities
reviewed by the committee in its nascence reflect a focus on infants and
young children, including fruit juices, milk, and infant formula.65
The EWG ostensibly implements the final guideline that new
lead ML recommendations be based on principles established in the
Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and
Feed. The document proposing new proposed draft MLs for lead in
selected commodities prepared for CCCF’s 2018 meeting specifically
invoked the principle of establishing MLs based on levels that are as low
as reasonably achievable (ALARA).66 The same principle is outlined
in the General Standard.67 However, the principle that contaminants in
food should be as low as reasonably achievable is itself a balancing
test requiring an assessment of the economic cost and the public health
benefit of further reducing MLs.68
C. The Appropriate Application of ALARA
The correct application of ALARA means any recommended
Codex Draft, supra note 6 (recommending stricter lead MLs for fruit juices, milk,
infant formula, canned fruits and vegetables, and cereal grains).
66 Codex Draft, supra note 6, at 8.
67 Codex Alimentarius, supra note 5, at 3 (stating that “[c]ontaminant levels in food
and feed shall be as low as reasonably achievable through best practice such as Good
Agricultural Practice . . . and Good Manufacturing Practice . . .”).
68 WHO & FAO, Food Safety Risk Analysis: A guide for national food safety
authorities, 87 FAO Food and Nutrition Paper, 2006, at 1, 31 (defining ALARA
as an approach to risk management that aims for the lowest level of risk “technically
possible and/or economically feasible under the circumstances. Some residual risk to
consumer typically remains; for example for . . . environmental contaminants in
otherwise wholesome foods.”); see also, Frédéric Bouder et al., The Tolerability of
Risk A New Framework for Risk Management 120 (Ragnar E. Löfstedt ed.,
Earthscan 2007) (defining ALARA as a weighing of risk versus cost feasibility
criteria); G.H. Eduljee, Trends in Risk Assessment and Risk Management, 249
The Science of the Total Environment 13, 19 (2000) (explaining that what
constitutes “reasonableness” in an ALARA approach “necessarily accommodates a
range of criteria covering human health, well being of the ecosystem, economic and
social factors, as well as the concept of fairness”); Commission Regulation 2006,
O.J. (L 364) ℙ 3–4 (EC) (endorsing both the ALARA principle and the principle of
proportionality).
65
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ML should be technically possible and economically feasible and
should take into account the health benefit and economic impact.69 The
recommendation that measures should be commensurate with the public
health benefit in the JECFA report, the obligation to take into account
different consumption patterns in the Codex Procedural Manual, and
the correct application of the ALARA principle identified in the General
Standard all call for an approach that balances economic cost with
public health benefit. For alcoholic beverages, which are age restricted,
the public health benefit of stricter standards is weaker. For high value
products such as wine and spirits, the economic cost is greater.
1. Expected public health benefit is reduced for lead reductions in
alcoholic beverages
The most vulnerable populations are already not exposed to
lead from alcoholic beverages because they are age restricted.
Consequently, the methodology the EWG uses for proposing draft MLs
does not clearly reflect JECFA’s recommendation or the ALARA
principle, and does not seem to take into account consumption patterns.
The EWG has:
no specific rule to identify the appropriate cut-off
value [for MLs], but in general, [its] approach has been to
recommend reductions in MLs when the percentage of
excluded samples was less than 5 percent.70
The EWG is applying the same methodology to the review of
the wine ML71 that it applied to infant formula.72 It is unclear
how a methodology that focuses only on the percentage of trade
potentially disrupted without taking into account dietary exposure or
the relative economic impact can ensure that steps taken are
commensurate with the level of risk reduction.
69 WHO & FAO, supra note 68, at 31 (defining ALARA as an approach to risk
management that aims for the lowest level of risk “technically possible and/or
economically feasible under the circumstances. Some residual risk to consumer
typically remains; for example for . . . environmental contaminants in otherwise
wholesome foods.”); G.H. Eduljee, supra note 68, at 19.
70 Codex Draft, supra note 6, at 9.
71 Id.
72 Codex Draft, supra note 6 (stating the recommendation of the EWG for infant
formula, which, one should note, was so lax that 99% of the available samples in the
GEMS database would have met it).
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Alcohol has different consumption patterns than other food
products.73 Consumption patterns and dietary exposure should be
considered when recommending maximum use levels for
contaminants.74 For adults, the greatest risk from lead exposure is
elevated systolic blood pressure.75 JECFA noted that for adults, “dietary
exposure corresponding to an increase in systolic blood pressure of 1
mmHg…was estimated to be 80…μg/day, or about 1.3…μg/kg bw
[body weight] per day.”76 For children the greatest risk is
neurodevelopmental and happens at much lower exposure levels than
the risk for adults.77 JECFA found that in children, “the chronic dietary
exposure corresponding to a decrease of 1 IQ point was estimated to be
12 μg/day…[the] equivalent to 0.6 μg/kg bw per day.”78 This indicates
that children warrant extra protection from dietary lead exposure.
With respect to a similar contamination concern, methylmercury
levels in fish, the U.S. and Japanese Codex delegations have consistently
opposed maximum limits that would impact international trade flows.79
The United States and Japan instead favor consumption guidance from
national health authorities indicating the excessive consumption of fish
of certain species can negatively harm infants, children, and pregnant
women.80 The risk profiles of methylmercury and lead are not identical.
However, given the myriad national laws that prohibit the consumption
Priya Deshmukh-Taskar et al., Does Food Group Consumption Vary by Differences
in Socioeconomic, Demographic, and Lifestyle Factors in young Adults? The Bogalusa
Heart Study, 107(2) J. Am. Diabetic Assoc. 16-18 (2007), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC2769987/pdf/nihms-150941.pdf.
74 Codex Manual, supra note 2, at 129–30.
75 See Evaluation, supra note 4.
76 Id. at 175.
77 Id. at 176–77.
78 Id. at 175.
79 Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Proposed Draft Maximum Levels for Methylmercury
in Fish Including Associated Sampling Plans, CX/CF 18/12/7, at 5–6, 10, (2018)
[hereinafter Codex Draft for Methylmercury in Fish]; but see Nicholas V.C. Ralston
et al., Selenium-Health Benefit Values as Seafood Safety Criteria 433 (SeKwon Kim ed., CRC Press 2014) (discussing how an outdated understanding of the
mechanisms of methylmercury toxicity leads to bad public health policy).
80 Codex Draft for Methylmercury in Fish, supra note 79; see generally Eating Fish:
What Pregnant Woman and Parents Should Know, Food Drug Admin., https://www.
fda.gov/downloads/Food/FoodborneIllnessContaminants/Metals/UCM537120.pdf
(last visited Oct. 14, 2018) (discussing advice on eating fish and shellfish).
73
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of alcoholic beverages by minors, it is unlikely that lead exposure
from alcoholic beverages presents a significant source of dietary lead
exposure to infants and children.
Adults already limit alcohol consumption under the guidance
of national health authorities.81 National guidelines also advise women
who are pregnant or who could become pregnant not to consume
alcohol.82 This guidance also limits dietary exposure of lead from
alcoholic beverages to fetuses, which are also vulnerable. Any health
benefit from reducing the ML for lead in alcoholic beverages is further
reduced because the guidance already plays a significant role in
reducing exposure from this source, even for adults. The same guidance
warnings the U.S. and Japanese Codex delegations suggest for the most
at-risk populations for methylmercury in fish are already more than
accomplished with respect to alcohol. As a result, those most vulnerable
to lead exposure consume a disproportionately small amount of alcohol,
and those least vulnerable already limit their dietary exposure to lead
from this source due to the other detrimental health impacts associated
with the overconsumption of alcohol.
2. The same cut-off points for MLs would have a
disproportionately large economic impact on trade vis-a-vis the
relatively minor health benefit for alcoholic beverages
The relatively high unit value of alcoholic beverages,
including wine, scotch, or cognac versus other products that are not agerestricted also indicates a need to exercise relatively more caution when
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t Of Health & Human Servs. & U.S. Dep’t Of Agric., 2015-2020
Dietary Guidelines For Americans 34 (8th ed. 2015), https://health.gov/
dietaryguidelines/2015/resources/2015-2020_Dietary_Guidelines.pdf
(advising
adults to limit alcohol consumption to “up to one drink per day for women and up to two
drinks per day for men”) [hereinafter Dietary Guidelines For Americans]; New Alcohol
Guidelines Launched, Dep’t of Health (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www. health-ni.gov.uk/
news/new-alcohol-guidelines-launched (recommending no more than 14 units of
alcohol per week); Nat’l Health & Med. Research Council, Frequently Asked Questions,
Alcohol Harm Reduction FAQ, (last visited Oct. 15, 2018) https:// nhmrc.gov.au/
file/1646/download?token=rIVX7h5N (recommending no more than two standard drinks
per day).
82 See, e.g., Dietary Guidelines For Americans, supra note 81, at 103 (advising that
“women who are or who may be pregnant should not drink”); New Alcohol Guidelines
Launched, supra note 81 (stating that “if you are pregnant or planning a pregnancy, the
safest approach is not to drink alcohol at all, to keep risks to your baby to a
minimum”); Nat’l Health & Med. Research Council, supra note 81.
81
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drafting safety measures that may restrict trade. The ML currently
proposed for wine is .05 ppm. This is the same ML that applied to
grape juice until July 2018 when the ML was modified to .04 ppm,
despite the vastly different consumer profile and consumption patterns
for the two products.83
The EWG’s opinion is that following the same
methodology for alcoholic beverages, such as wine, (i.e.
recommending MLs at a level such that less than 5% of samples in
the GEMS database for wine would fail to meet it) as for other products
is consistent with the ALARA principle.84 However, it is worth noting
that while the percentage of wine in the sample that would fail to
meet the hypothetical ML is 3.4%,85 the percentage of GEMS
samples of infant formula with a limit of quantification that would
have failed to meet the hypothetical ML proposed in 2013 was
only .37%, nearly one tenth as restrictive as the proposed ML for
wine.86 It is peculiar that a product that will be consumed
exclusively by those least vulnerable would be subject to standards
more restrictive than those for a product that is consumed exclusively
by those most vulnerable. Additionally, the entire global market for
infant formula, including infant formula domestically consumed,
is estimated at more than $45 billion.87 Meanwhile, the global
market for alcoholic beverages is estimated at over $1.2 trillion.88 If the
global alcohol market contracted by 3.4%, it would equal roughly $41
billion.
83 FAO & WHO, Codex Alimentarius Comm’n, Rep. of the 41st Session of the Codex
Alimentarius Comm’n, REP18/CAC, at 74 (2018), http://www.fao.org/faowho-codexalimentarius/sh-proxy/en/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.
fao.org%252Fsites%252Fcodex%252FMeetings%252FCX-701-41%252FReport%2
52FFINAL%252FREP18_CACe.pdf (adopting maximum levels for lead in selected
commodities).
84 Codex Draft, supra note 6, at 13.
85 Id. at 18–19 (313 out of 9342 samples).
86 Id. at 9.
87 Tage Affertsholt & Daniel Pedersen, Infant Formula: A Young & Dynamic
Market, World of Food Ingredients, 32 (2017), https://www.3abc.dk/wp-content/
uploads/2017/06/Infant-Formula-A-Young-and-Dynamic-Market.pdf.
88 Transparency Market Research, Global Alcoholic Beverages Market to reach
US$1,977,342.7 Million by 2025, Globe Newswire (Sept. 21, 2017, 5:53 AM), https://
globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/09/21/1125738/0/en/Global-AlcoholicBeverages-Market-to-reach-US-1-977-342-7-Million-by-2025-TMR.html.
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For wine there is an emerging international consensus
supporting a forward-looking ML of .15 ppm for wine. In 2015, the
European Union adopted an ML of .2 ppm (the current Codex ML) for
wine vintages dating 2001 to 2015, and .15 ppm for wines produced in
2016 or later.89 This is the same level the OIV (an intergovernmental
wine standard organization with 46 member states) has established,
though the OIV’s transition year is 2007 rather than 2015.90 Mercosur
has also adopted an ML of .15 ppm, impacting Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay.91 Chile has likewise adopted an ML of .15
ppm.92 Where countries have adopted limits, these tend to be forward
looking limits to avoid ex post facto regulation of a class of products
with an extremely long shelf life.93 An ML of .15 ppm would still
provide some margin of food safety improvement (the maximum level
of lead in a wine sample in the GEMS database was .584 ppm) without
overly restricting international trade.94
While the only alcoholic beverage currently under consideration
for a revised lead ML is wine,95 another EWG is currently prioritizing
future work to establish lead MLs.96 This EWG placed significant
priority on the consumption patterns of children for some commodities,
but ultimately concluded alcoholic beverages (other than wine) were
a higher priority (intermediate priority) than non-alcoholic beverages
Commission Regulation 2015/1005 of June 25, 2015, Amending Regulation (EC) No
1881/2006 as Regards Maximum Levels of Lead in Certain Foodstuffs, 2015 O.J. (L
161), 12 [hereinafter Maximum Levels of Lead].
90 International Code of Oenological Practices, Annex Maximum Acceptable
Limits, at 2 (Jan. 2015), http://www.oiv.int/public/medias/3741/e-code-annexmaximum-acceptable-limits.pdf.
91 Reglamento Tecnico Mercosur Sobre Limites Maximos de Contaminantes
Inorganicos en Alimentos 8 (2011).
92 Ministerio de Agricultura de Chile, Decreto N° 78, Art. 26 (1986).
93 See, e.g. Maximum Levels of Lead, supra note 89, at 12. Note the EU Standard has
markedly different standards for fruit juices and for wine, presumably based on the
divergent risk profile as a result of the disparate consumption profile.
94 Codex Draft, supra note 6, at 18.
95 See FAO & WHO, Codex Alimentarius Comm’n., Rep. of the 12th
Session of the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, REP18/
CF, at 45 (2018), http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/sh-proxy/
en/?lnk=1&url=https%253A%252F%252Fworkspace.fao.org%252Fsites%252Fcodex
%252FMeetings%252FCX-735-12%252FREPORT%252520%2528FINAL%2529%2
52FREP18_CFe.pdf.
96 See Codex Discussion Paper, supra note 9, at 126–131.
89
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(low priority).97 This means there will probably be an ML
established for cognac sooner than for cola. It is also likely the same
methodology that is applied to Welch’s concord grape juice will apply
to Rémy Martin Black Pearl Louis XIII.
None of this is to say definitively that a rule based on
tolerating a rejection rate of less than 5% is inappropriate for alcoholic
beverages. However, there must be proportionality or else
standards would be arbitrary. If the economic cost of applying this rule
to alcoholic beverages is warranted based on the public health benefits,
then CCCF must apply even stricter standards for lead MLs to
products marketed for children and largely consumed by children.
Tightening such standards would provide a far greater public health
benefit for the same economic cost vis-à-vis tightening standards on
alcoholic beverages.
IV. Conclusion
Reducing lead exposure from food consumption is a noble
goal. It is a goal Codex, CCCF, and the EWG all take seriously.
However, it is an intermediate goal. The ultimate goal is to achieve
improved public health outcomes while simultaneously minimizing
the negative impact on international trade. All public health
regulations are designed to create public health benefits. There are also
economic costs to some public health regulations, including the
adoption of international standards that are often subsumed into
national regulations.
It is rational that the EWG would seek to apply a
heuristic method for balancing cost and benefit relying on the
formulaic less than 5% rule. This approach is faster and cheaper
than conducting an assessment that would truly comply with the
ALARA approach. Such an assessment would require evaluating the
economic impact of each proposed lead ML (due to restricted
trade, or the cost to producers of modifying production
methodologies to reduce contamination in the final product)
weighed against a public health assessment of lead exposure with an
age-specific regression analysis to ensure consistent application of a
cost-benefit ratio. The former can be done with a calculator and a data
set.
97

Id.
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The latter would take a team of economists and dietary experts and
more rigorous dietary survey data, which in turn would entail a
significant cost. However, when the very nature of the product
makes it clear the most vulnerable would not be protected by further
restriction, a different heuristic is called for.
The SPS Agreement calls for “consistency in the
application of the concept of appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection.”98 The Codex Procedural Manual
states “[u]njustified differences in the level of consumer health
protection to address similar risks in different situations should be
avoided.”99 The inherent corollary is that unjustified uniformity in the
use of risk management metrics to address different risks posed by
different situations should also be avoided. It would otherwise result
in inconsistent levels of protection and arbitrary and unjustifiable
standards.100 It is not clear that the less than 5% heuristic is
inappropriate when applied to alcoholic beverages. However, if this is
the rule Codex will apply to alcohol, it would do well to tighten the
limits on products marketed for children.
SPS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 5.5.
Codex Manual, supra note 2, at 116.
100 See WTO, United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R, at 63–72 (Oct. 12, 1998) (stating that the United States’ application
of the same environmental standard to trading partners without considering the
different conditions prevalent within those trading partners constituted unjustifiable
discrimination under the chapeau of GATT Article XX).
98

99

Regulating China’s Food E-commerce: Harmonization of Laws
Pinghui Xiao*
Introduction
Internet commercialization began in China in 1995. Since
then, China has seen a digitalization movement, which has become
a joint undertaking between industry and government in the age of
ubiquitous Internet in China. China’s Premier Li Keqiang announced
‘Internet Plus’ as the national strategy in his Government Work Report
presented during the Two Sessions of the year of 2015. Following
Premier Li’s vision for the ‘Internet Plus’ Strategy, China is now
determined “to integrate mobile Internet, cloud computing, big data,
and the Internet of Things with modern manufacturing, to encourage
the healthy development of e-commerce, industrial networks, and
Internet banking, and to help get Internet-based companies to increase
their presence in the international market.”Under the auspices of
‘Internet Plus’, e-commerce became one of the most important priority
areas to promote China’s continuing prosperity.
China’s digitalization movement has substantially impacted
the food sector, creating the so-called digital food economy and
allowing food e-commerce, or online food trading, to become a rising
star in China’s ever increasing digital economy. While the internet has
connected and shaped China’s industries and businesses, it has also
created problems. When new types of businesses proliferate and start
to penetrate into conventional sectors, regulations, created based on
the traditional sectors, become outdated. Unfortunately, this has been
the case with food e-commerce as well.
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As with any new sector, government policies and laws are not
without drawbacks, and indeed gaps have arisen. In response,
China has already amended its Food Safety Law in 2015
(hereinafter referred to as ‘2015 FLS Amendment’), introducing
specific rules related to online food trading. Equally
importantly, in August 2018, China’s top legislature, the Standing
Committee of the NPC, promulgated its first E-commerce
Law, which has greatly impacted food e-commerce.
This paper documents the development of China’s digital food
economy in the course of China’s digitalization movement and takes a
closer look at China’s legislative approach to regulation of food
commerce by paying particular attention to all the major pieces of
legislation relating to food e-commerce, particularly the 2015 FLS
Amendment and the E-commerce Law. This paper will then examine
the challenges China faces in harmonizing its food e-commerce laws.
I. CHINA’S DIGITAL FOOD ECONOMYAND RISING FOOD ECOMMERCE
Food supply chain includes, but is not limited to, stages of
production and manufacturing, storage, transport, retailing and the
like. In other words, the whole food supply chain consists of
agricultural production, food manufacturing, food distribution,
catering and food import and export, which can be illustrated in the
following figure (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Food Safety Chain

2018]

Regulating China’s Food E-Commerce

306

The Internet can be widely used in the above interlinked
sectors within the food supply chain, to create a digital food
economy.1 The actual functionality of the Internet throughout the
digital food economy varies. The Internet alone cannot produce
foods, but it can be used to increase production efficiency for
certain food production lines, like sugar plants.2 Hence, the
application of the Internet in production and manufacturing
exemplifies the Industrial Internet, which sees ‘the deeper meshing
of the digital world with the world of machines holds the potential
to bring about profound transformation to global industry’.3
The Industrial Internet can be an efficient and productive tool to
facilitate production and manufacturing.4 Furthermore, within
sectors in which consumers play a larger role, such as distribution,
catering services, and import and export, the Internet even has more
to offer. The Internet become a transaction and trading platform for
foods. Here in this circumstance, due to the fact that the Internet is
used for the purpose of consumers and trading, the use of the
Internet creates a Consumption Internet or e-commerce scenario.
All the factors combined make China enter the age of the digital
food economy, which is comprised of the Industrial Internet and the
Consumption Internet, or e-commerce.
To date, there are quite a few government initiatives
topromote both the Industrial Internet and e-commerce in China.
According to the Action Plan for Industrial Internet Development
(2018-2020) enacted by the Ministry of Industry and Information
Technology, China will have to tackle the problems arising from
the development of the Industrial Internet.5 To do this, it will be
necessary to carry out research on such legal issues as network
security, data protection, as well as information protection and
1 See Juergen Voegele, Farm and Food Policy Innovations for the Digital Age,
Brookings Inst. (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/futuredevelopment/2018/10/11/farm-and-food-policy-innovations-for-the-digital-age/.
2 Peter C. Evans & Marco Annunziata, Industrial Internet: Pushing the Boundaries
of Minds and Machines, Gen. Elec., at 16 (Nov. 26, 2012), https://www.ge.com/docs/
chapters/Industrial_Internet.pdf.
3 Id. at 3
4 Id.
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government data disclosure, and enact laws and rules relating to the
Industrial Internet when necessary.6 As per the Opinions on the
Development
of
E-commerce to Accelerate the Development of New Economy
enacted by the State Council, China is committed to introducing laws
and rules relating to food e-commerce to speed up e-commerce.7 To
this end, China will introduce measures to regulate food e-commerce
and strengthen monitoring mechanisms for food e-commerce.8
Simply put, the above government Industrial Internet and
e-commerce initiatives create China’s big picture of digital food
economy. Because problems arise from both the Industrial Internet
and food e-commerce in the age of the digital food economy,
regulation is required. At the moment, challenges relating to food ecommerce are more acute and urgent than those relating to the
Industrial Internet.9 Therefore, this paper will pay more attention to
food e-commerce regulation.
According to Statista, 9 of the world’s top 20 Internet
companies are from China.10 At least five of these Chinese Internet
companies are involved in food e-commerce. These companies are:
Alibaba, Baidu, JD.com, Meituan and Tencent.11 These Internet
companies have grown to become China’s most influential food
e-commerce platforms, which are “unicorn players involving food ecommerce including but not limited to online food retailing, online
catering services and cross-border food e-commerce”.12
5 工业互联网发展行动计划（2018-2020 年 [Action Plan for Industrial Internet
Development (2018-2020)], Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
(MIIT) (June 7, 2018), http://www.cac.gov.cn/1122955095_15284189066411n.pdf.
6 Id. at 11.
7 关于大力发展电子商务加快培育经济新动力的意见 [Opinions on the Development
of E-commerce to Accelerate the Development of New Economy], 国务院
[State Council]
(May
4,
2015),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/
content/2015-05/07/content_9707.htm.
8 Id.
9 Pinghui Xiao [肖平辉], 我国网络食品立法进程及相关问题探讨 [A study of
legislative development of online food trading and relevant issues in China], 工商行
政管理 [Administration for Industry and Commerce] (2018).
10 See Market Capitalization of the Biggest Internet Companies Worldwide as of May
2018, Statista (May 2018), https://www.statista.com/statistics/277483/market-valueof-the-largest-internet-companies-worldwide/.
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China’s food e-commerce creates market failure arising from
information asymmetry.13 Such market failures include: unlicensed
food businesses, fake and inferior food products purchased online,
false information about foods, and ineffective logistics and delivery.14
E-commerce lawsuits increased by more than 40% in 2017, far higher
than the average lawsuit growth.15 More than half of these e-commerce
lawsuits are food products related, with 83% of food e-commerce
disputes involving platforms.16 Violation of food laws has an issue for
platforms selling food. For instance, March 2016 saw many restaurants
on Ele.me, one of China’s biggest online food catering platforms,
charged for operating without licenses.17 In addition to fabricating
addresses and images of outlets shown in the platform, it was also
revealed that the platform helped food business operators fabricate
information for non-existing restaurants to create ‘ghost restaurants’,
which provided catering services.18
II. REGULATING FOOD E-COMMERCE: POLICY AND LAWS
To tackle the challenges arising from food e-commerce, China
introduced the 2015 FSL Amendment, which became the country’s first
law to regulate food e-commerce.19 Following the 2015 FSL
Amendment,
China
Food
and
Drug
Administration
(hereinafter referred to as ‘CFDA’) also introduced the Measures for
Investigation and Punishment of Unlawful Acts Concerning Online
11 Xiao,

Legislative Development, supra note 7, at 314–16.
Id.
13 Id. at 315.
14 Pinghui Xiao [肖平辉], 互联网背景下食品安全治理研究[China’s food
safety governance in the age of the Internet Plus] 知识产权出版社
[Intellectual Property Publishing House, 2018] 230-31 [hereinafter
China’s food safety governance in the age of the Internet Plus].
15 Xiao, Legislative Development, supra note 7, at 313.
16 Id.
17 Zhang Shuai, Ele.me Apologizes for Unlicensed Restaurants on App, Crenglish
(Mar. 17, 2016, 7:12 PM), http://english.cri.cn/12394/2016/03/17/3821s920837.htm.
18 Xiao, Legislative Development, supra note 7, at 316.
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Food Safety (hereinafter referred to as ‘Online Food Measures’) in
2016 and the Measures on Supervision and Administration of Food
Safety concerning Online Catering Services (hereinafter referred to as
‘Online Catering Services Measures’) in 2017 to implement the law.20
The 2015 FSL Amendment, along with the two other specific
Measures, constitute the 2015 FSL Amendment cluster, which
regulate food e-commerce. Of equal importance is that the Standing
Committee of the NPC promulgated China’s first E-commerce Law
on August 31st, 2018. This law adopted a new approach to ecommerce regulation, which will have a profound effect on food ecommerce.21 This E-commerce Law goes hand in hand with the 2015
FSL Amendment cluster to shape food e-commerce. The paper will
provide an in-depth discussion of both the 2015 E-Commerce Law
and the 2005 FSL Amendment cluster and explore their impacts upon
China’s rising food e-commerce regulation.
A. Regulating food e-commerce under the 2015 FSL
Amendment cluster
Within the 2015 FSL Amendment cluster, the Online Food
Measures and the Online Catering Services Measures are rules enacted
by the CFDA. These rules belong to lower level of laws, which
are meant to implement the 2015 FSL Amendment.22 However, in
terms of coverage, both the 2015 FSL Amendment and the Online
Food Measures are generally applied to all kinds of online food
trading, while the Online Catering Services Measures are applied
to online catering services providers.23 Simply put, the 2015 FSL
19 See China Passes Sweeping Amendment to Food Safety Law: The Most Stringent To
Date, LexisNexis (July 16,2015), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/publicpolicy/b/public-policy-law-blog/posts/china-passes-sweeping-amendment-to-foodsafety-law-the-most-stringent-to-date.
20 Xiao, Legislative Development, supra note 7, at 318–19.
21 Pinghui Xiao [肖平辉], 我国网络食品立法进程及相关问题探讨 [A study of
legislative development of online food trading and relevant issues in China], 工商行政
管理 [Administration for Industry and Commerce] (2018).
22 Yibo Jiang Et Al., China Food Safety Law- Practical Procedures, Trends
and Opportunities for Dutch Companies 5 (2018), https://www.netherlandsandyou.
nl/binaries/netherlandsandyou/documents/publications/2018/03/14/booklet-on-thechina-food-safety-law/final+booklet.pdf.
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Amendment and the Online Food Measures are framed to provide a
general regulatory system for online food trading. However, the
Online Catering Services Measures are rules established to
specifically regulate the online catering sector rather than general
food e-commerce.24 The 2015 FSL Amendment created a legal term
called ‘online third-party food trading platform provider’ to denote
the platforms involving foods.25 Considering the fact that online
food platforms play ever-increasing role in online food trading, all the
above pieces of legislation treat online food platforms as coregulators with food authorities to ensure online food safety.26 To this
end, quite a few provisions of the 2015 FSL Amendment cluster
compel online platforms to monitor and supervise online food
operators. This creates a public-private co-regulation scenario, which
reflects the so-called social co-governance principle as established in
the 2015 FSL Amendment.27 In addition, because of the unique nature
of the sector, special regulations have been created for online catering.
1. Obligations for online food platforms
The 2015 FSL Amendment laid down the first comprehensive
legal obligations requiring platforms to ensure food business operators
within the platforms do business in compliance with food safety
requirements as laid down in the law.28 Online food platforms are
required to fulfill the following supervisory roles: 1) to conduct realname registration for food business operators within the platforms and
to define food safety management responsibility of the food business
operators,29 2) to check and inspect licenses obtained by the food
business operators, 3) when there is a minor noncompliance from
23 Building Food Safety Governance in China 212 (Jerome Lepeintre and Juanjuan
Sun, eds., 2018), https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/building_food_
safety_governance_in_china.pdf.
24 Id.
25 For the purpose of this paper, ‘online third-party food trading platform provider’
is hereinafter referred to as ‘‘online food platform provider’ and ‘online third-party
food trading platform’ as ‘online food platform’.
26 Xiao, Legislative Development, supra note 7, at 318.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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food business operators, to stop the violation and report back to the
local food authority, 4) when there is a serious noncompliance from
food business operators, to stop providing services to the operators.30
The above four tasks can be grouped into two categories of
obligations as assumed by the platforms, namely, obligations
relating to entry control and obligations relating to process control.
1.1 Entry control obligations
The real-name registration and defining food safety
management on the one hand, and license inspection on the other, are
both concerned with entry control, which serves as a screening
mechanism that keeps unqualified food business operators from
entering the platforms and selling food via them.31 In addition, the
entry control procedures also make it possible to collect relevant
identity information from those food business operators, which allow
the platforms to better monitor them. The above tasks evolved into
more specific sub-tasks under the Online Food Measures.
First, platforms are required to file official records. For those
platforms, which are thought of solely as intermediaries, the EU is not
poised to make them subject to licenses or any other authorizations,
with a few case-by-case exceptions.32 However, licensing in China has
become a very important mechanism for government regulation, the
Real-name registration here should not be confused with industrial and commercial
registration for the purpose of individual industrial and commercial households and
companies. The former is conducted by the online platforms, which are a private
stakeholder whereas the latter is done by public authorities. See e.g., 中华人民共和
国个体工商户条例(2016修订) [Regulation on Individual Industrial and Commercial
Households (2016 Revision)], 国务院[State Council] 2016); 中华人民共和国
公司登记管理条例(2016修订 [Regulation of the People’s Republic of China
on the Administration of Company Registration (2016 Revision)], 国务院
[State Council] (Feb. 6, 2016).
30 Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó xíngzhèng xǔkě fǎ (中华人民共和国食品安全法
（2015年修订) [Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China (Amended in
2015)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2009,
revised Apr. 24, 2015), art. 62 , 2015China Law Lexis 1812 [hereinafter Food
Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China].
31 FIA Staff, Food Safety in China’s e-Commerce Platforms, Food Industry Asia
(Nov. 3, 2014), https://foodindustry.asia/food-safety-in-china-s-e-commerceplatforms.
29
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legal basis of which can be found in the Administrative License
Law.33 Under this Law, China’s public regulatory authorities grant
licenses to citizens, legal persons, or other organization to
engage in special activities according to their applications.34
Since the introduction of the Administrative License Law,
China has created a comprehensive administrative registration
and licensing system for all kinds of commercial and industrial
activities. The system is comprised of industrial and commercial
registration (hereinafter referred to as ‘ICR’) as administered by
competent public authorities and other special business licenses
as organized by various other public authorities.35 The legal
requirements for the former registration are laid down in the
Regulation on the Administration of Company Registration and
the Regulation on Individual Industrial and Commercial
Households, whereas the latter are specified in quite a few
scattered laws depending on specific relevant fields, for instance, the
2015 FSL Amendment.36
Nevertheless, it was suggested that China introduce a
licensing mechanism to online food platforms prior to the 2015 FSL
Amendment. However, at that time, the State Council was in an
effort to streamline administration. It announced a reform scheme
dedicated to relaxing market access, by which the pre-existing
Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region:
A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, COM (2016) 356 final (Feb. 6,
2016).
33 Zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó xíngzhèng xǔkě fǎ, (中华人民共和国行政许可法)
[Administrative Licensing Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004), 2003 China
Law Lexis 4454 (China).
34 Id. at art. 1.
35 The industrial and commercial registration should not to be confused with platform
registration, which is private by nature. See id. at art. 12.
36 See e.g., Guówùyuàn guānyú xiūgǎi “zhōnghuá rénmín gònghéguó gōngsī dēngjì
guǎnlǐ tiáolì” de juédìng (2016) (中华人民共和国公司登记管理条例(2016修订
[Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Company
Registration (2016 Revision)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm, Nat’l People’s
Cong., revised Feb. 6, 2016), 2016 China Law Lexus 1322; Food Safety Law of the
People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 46.
32
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registration and licensing would continue to be greatly
streamlined.37
Local governments in China are undergoing
deregulation reform, which is made possible through various
initiatives, for instance, De-licensing Scheme created by
Shaoxing, Zhejiang Province.38 Within the Scheme, licensing
and other authorization mechanisms are replaced with filing for
records, among others, to reduce market access barriers.
Online food platforms are a technology driven phenomenon
which can help generate jobs. However, the idea to create a special
license as a market access mechanism for these platforms was finally
rejected.39 Instead, CFDA promulgated the Online Food Measures, and
it introduced a recordation mechanism, which is less stringent than
a licensing mechanism.40 The recordation mechanism is not meant
to provide market access for platforms. Local food safety authorities
in certain localities, where an online food platform operates, will
at least have a record of the platform information, which helps the
government to supervise the platforms.
Under the Online Food Measures, the provider of an online
food platform shall, within 30 working days upon approval by the
competent communications authorities, file for the recordation
37 Guó

wù yuàn guān yú jiā kuài gòu jiàn qún zhòng chuàng yè chuàng xīn zhī chēng
píng tái de zhǐ dǎo yì jiàn (国务院关于加快构建群众创业创新支撑平台的指导
意见) [Guiding Opinions of the State Council on Accelerating the Construction of
Supporting Platforms of Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation] (promulgated by the
State Council, Sept. 23, 2015, effective Sept. 23, 2015) 2015 China Law LEXIS 1075
(China).
38 Kuotsai Tom Liou, Local Economic Development in China and the United States:
Strategies and Issues, 69 Pub. Admin. Rev. S29 (2009).
39 See WǍNG LUÒ SHÍ PǏN ĀN QUÁN WĒI FǍ XÍNG WÉI CHÁ CHǓ BÀN FǍ
(网络食品安全违法行为查处办法) [Measures of Investigation of Illegal Conducts
Concerning the Safety of Food Sold Online] (promulgated by China Food and Drug
Administration, July 13, 2016, effective October 1, 2016) art. 16, 2016 Lexis China
Law 370, (China). (stating that “a party engaging in food production that has obtained
licensing for food production is not required to obtain licensing for food business
operations if it sells self-produced food products online” and “a party engaging in
food business operations that has obtained licensing for food business operations is
not required to obtain licensing for food production if it sells online food products that
it produces and processes”).
40 See id., at art. 5 (stating that “providers of third-party online food transaction
platforms and parties engaging in food production and business operations by
online means shall . . . provide relevant data an information concerning online food
transactions in accordance with the requirements of food and drug administrations”
and making no mention of a licensing requirement under the measure).
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formalities with the provincial food authority at the place where it
is located.41 Upon success, the provider will be issued a recordation
number. The information for recordation shall include domain name,
IP address, telecommunications business permit, enterprise name,
name of the enterprise’s legal representative or person in charge
and recordation number, among others. The food authorities at the
provincial level and the municipal and county level shall, within 7
working days after the completion of the filing, disclose the relevant
recordation information to the public.42
Second, platforms are entitled to make rules. The provider of
an online food platform is obliged to introduce all kinds of rules to
ensure industry compliance from food business operators, which is
comparable to rule-making. Here the rule-making obligation actually
amounts to rule-making powers delegated from the government,
which empowers online food platforms to be legislators. Online food
platforms are now officially recognized as rule makers. This enables
online food platforms to be more institutionalized to supervise online
food operators within the platforms.
These rules were enacted to examine and register online food
business operators, to stop and report violations of food safety laws, to
stop platform from providing services for severe violators of laws, and
to publicly disclose the relevant rules on the online platform.43
Third, platforms are required to inspect business licenses and
other information of the food business operators. Under the
Administrative License Law, ICRs, and specific business licenses
constitute the fundamental business licensing institutions in China.44
As for food business operation, those operating food businesses
will have to apply for food business licenses from CFDA. Food
business operators include food producers, food retailers and catering
services providers, among others in China. Chinese food businesses
are generally divided into two types, namely, food production and
distribution. Correspondingly, China creates two food business
Id. at art. 8.
Id.
43 Id. at art. 10.
44 See Zhōnghuá, supra note 46.
41

42
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licenses for the entire food chain, namely, food production licenses
and food distribution licenses.45
The above-mentioned food business licenses are granted by
public authorities rather than online food platforms.46 However, the
provider of an online food platform is obliged to inspect relevant food
licenses of production, food additive production, and/or food
distribution as obtained by online food business operators, and record
and update when needed. In the case of small food business operators,
in particular small farm operators selling edible agricultural products
over the platform, the provider is obliged to keep a record of the
operators’ ICR, ID number, home address, contact information, and
update when needed.47
Fourth, platforms are required to conduct profiling and filing
of food business operators. China’s food authorities engage
in profiling and filing activities for the purposes of food business
operators. For instance, local food authorities at and above the county
level should create food safety credit files of food producers and
distributors to record the information on the issuance of food
production licenses, inspection of licensing matters, daily supervision
and inspection, and investigation of and punishment against licensingSee, e.g., Shí pǐn shēng chǎn xǔ kě guǎn lǐ bàn fǎ (2017 xiū zhèng) (食品生产许可
管理办法) (2017修正)[Administrative Measures for Food Production Licensing (2017
Amendment)] (promulgated by the China Food and Drug Administration, Nov. 11,
2017, effective Nov. 17, 2017) 2017 China Law LEXIS 1410 (China); Shí pǐn jīng
yíng xǔ kě guǎn lǐ bàn fǎ (食品经营许可管理办法) [Administrative Measures for
Food Distribution Licensing] (promulgated by the China Food and Drug
Administration, Aug. 31, 2015, effective Oct. 1, 2015) Enpkulaw.cn CLI.4.256408
(EN) (China).
46 See Shí pǐn shēng chǎn xǔ kě guǎn lǐ bàn f ǎ (2017 xiū zhèng) (食品生产许可管
理办法) (2017修正)[Administrative Measures for Food Production Licensing (2017
Amendment)] (promulgated by the China Food and Drug Administration, Nov. 11,
2017, effective Nov. 17, 2017) 2017 China Law LEXIS 1410 (China) (noting that
“local food and drug administrative authorities at or above the county level shall be
responsible for the food production licensing administration within their respective
administrative areas”); see Shí pǐn jīng yíng xǔ kě guǎn lǐ bàn fǎ (食品经营许可管理
办法) [Administrative Measures for Food Distribution Licensing] (promulgated by the
China Food and Drug Administration, Aug. 31, 2015, effective Oct. 1, 2015)
Enpkulaw. cn CLI.4.256408 (EN) (China) (noting that “local food and drug
administration at and above the county level shall be responsible for administering
food distribution licensing within their respective administrative regions”).
47 Wǎng luò shí pǐn ān quán wéi fǎ xíng wéi chá chǔ bàn fǎ (网络食品安全违法行为
查处办法) [Measures for the Investigation and Handling of Illegalities of Online Food
Safety] (promulgated by the China Food and Drug Administration, July 13, 2016,
effective Oct. 1, 2016), art. 11, Westlaw China Order No. 27.
45

2018]

Regulating China’s Food E-Commerce

316

related violations, among others.48 The filing can be used to increase
the frequency of supervision and inspection of food producers
and distributors in case of poor credit records.49 This will be made
public, through which food business operators can be motivated to
abide by the law. Food authorities are also required to create files of
food business operators for their own records.50 For instance, a food
authority at or above the county level, shall establish management
rules for food production and distribution licensing archives, and
archive in a timely manner the materials on the above licenses.51
Similarly, as the provider of an online food platform is
considered a co-regulator, it is obliged to create a profile of online
food business operators and file accordingly. In addition, it will have
to keep a record of the basic information of the food business
operators and the food safety management personnel.52
Profiling and filing here is different from filing for an official
record as discussed above. Here the information for profiling and
filing is mainly from the food business operators whereas filing for
an official record is targeted at information of online food platforms.
1.2 Process control obligations
The process control requirements as laid down in the 2015
FSL Amendment, oblige platforms to monitor and supervise food
business operators within the platforms.53 The above tasks evolve into
more specific sub-tasks under the Online Food Measures.
48 Shí pǐn shēng chǎn xǔ kě guǎn lǐ bàn f ǎ (2017 xiū zhèng) (食品生产许可管理办
法) (2017修正)[Administrative Measures for Food Production Licensing (2017
Amendment)] (promulgated by the China Food and Drug Administration, Nov. 11,
2017, effective Nov. 17, 2017), art. 45, 2017 China Law LEXIS 1410.
49 Id. at art. 40, art. 45.
50 Id.
51 Id. at art. 48; Shí pǐn jīng yíng xǔ kě guǎn lǐ bàn fǎ (食品经营许可管理办法)
[Administrative Measures for Food Distribution Licensing] (promulgated by the
China Food and Drug Administration, Aug. 31, 2015, effective Oct. 1, 2015), art. 43,
Enpkulaw.cn CLI.4.256408 (EN) (China).
52 Wangluo Shipinanquan Weifa Xingwei Chachu Banfa (网络食品安全违法行为
查处办法) [Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Safety of Food
Offered through Online Catering Services] (promulgated by the China Food and Drug
Admin., Nov. 06, 2017, effective Jan. 01, 2018), art. 13, 2017 China Law Lexis 1348.
53 Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 78.
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First, platforms are obliged to fulfill certain technical
requirements. In 2016, China promulgated the Cyber Security
Law, the first of its kind in China.54 The law recognizes the Internet
provides a very important infrastructure for economic development
and, if not well controlled, could endanger national security.55 Under
the law, even food delivery platforms may be considered critical
infrastructure.56 This means that any entity considered “critical
information infrastructure”, some of which hold significant amounts
of information on Chinese citizens, will be under scrutiny from
cyberspace regulators.57
Similarly, an online food platform is required to fulfill
technical requirements before they provide services. Technical
requirements include, but are not limited to, maintaining data backup
and recovery technologies with a view of ensuring the reliability and
security of the data and information relating to online food trading.58
Second, platforms will have to maintain a record-keeping
system to document business transactions of the food business
operators. Under 2015 FSL Amendment, record-keeping is a very
important mechanism to ensure compliance.59 Both food producers
and distributors are required to keep a record of product and trading
information. For instance, a food distributor shall establish a record
system for checking the purchased food, honestly record the name,
specifications, quantity, date or batch number of production,
shelf life, and date of purchase of food and the names, addresses, and
Zhonghua Renmin Gongeguo Wangluo Anquan Fa (中华人民共和国网络安全
法) [Cyber Security Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong, Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017),
2016 China Law LEXIS 1398.
55 Id. at art. 1.
56 Mirren Gidda, China’s New Cybersecurity Law Could Cost Foreign Companies
Their Ideas, Newsweek (May 31, 2017), https://www.newsweek.com/chinacybersecurity-hacking-intellectual-property-multinationals-618345.
57 Carly Ramsey & Ben Wootliff, China’s Cyber Security Law: The Impossibility
of Compliance?, Forbes (May 29, 2017),https://www.forbes.com/sites/
riskmap/2017/05/29/chinas-cyber-security-law-theimpossibility-of-compliance/
#1d96f231471c.
58 WǍNG LUÒ SHÍ PǏN ĀN QUÁN WĒI FǍ XÍNG WÉI CHÁ CHǓ BÀN FǍ
( 网络食品安全违法行为查处办法) [Measures for Investigation and Punishment of
Unlawful Acts concerning Online Food Safety] (promulgated by China Food and
Drug Administration, July 13, 2016, effective October 1, 2016), art. 9, 2016 Lexis
China Law 370 [hereinafter Measures for Investigation].
59 Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 46.
54
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contact methods of suppliers, and retain the relevant vouchers.60 The
retention period of records and vouchers shall not be less than six
months after the expiry of the shelf-life of products; or shall not be
less than two years for products without an express shelf life.61
Similarly, the provider of an online food platform is obliged to
maintain a record of food trading information and record-keeping time
shall not be less than 6 months after the expiry date of the food
products; in case of food products without any express expiry date,
record-keeping time shall not be less than 2 years after the selling.62
Third, platforms are required to monitor business operation of
the food business operators within the platforms. The provider of an
online food platform trading platform is obliged to set up a food safety
department or assign a food safety professional to inspect online food
business activities and information.63 If the provider is aware of food
safety violations, it shall timely stop and report them to the local food
authorities at the county level.64
The above obligation requires platforms to detect misconducts
and false information from food business operators. As observed
by Mr. Chen Xu, former Director-General of CFDA’s Department
of Legal Affairs, online catering platforms are required to conduct
random inspection and surveillance to detect noncompliance from the
catering service providers.65 This is very challenging to some extent,
because platforms are expected to monitor the whole process of online
food business running within the platforms. In practice, the platforms
only have information of food products and logistics, submitted or
generated by food business operators. The platforms are expected to
Id. at art. 51.
WǍNG LUÒ SHÍ PǏN ĀN QUÁN WĒI FǍ XÍNG WÉI CHÁ CHǓ BÀN FǍ ( 网络
食品安全违法行为查处办法) [Measures of Investigation of Illegal Conducts
Concerning the Safety of Food Sold Online] (promulgated by China Food and Drug
Administration, July 13, 2016, effective October 1, 2016) art. 13, 2016 Lexis China
Law 370, 5 (China).
62 Id. at art. 14.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See id. at arts. 29–37 (providing penalties for platform providers who fail to comply
with various obligations pertaining to the monitoring and record-keeping of online
food producer/trader business practices).
60
61
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watch business activities from online food businesses. This is hardly
made possible for platforms without assigning their management team
for an on-site inspection. However, it is too expensive for online food
platforms, in particular those involving food retailing, to create teams
like this. Simply put, the platforms involving food retailing don’t
think it is feasible for them to do on-site inspection, considering high
cost arising from manpower and time. Nevertheless, there is
no clarification as to how this obligation should be implemented in
practice to date.
Fourth, platforms are required to stop providing services
under certain specific circumstances. One the one hand, Online Food
Measures specifies scenarios in which the platforms will have to stop
providing services to online food operators upon their serious
violations. On the other hand, there are scenarios in which authorities
will order platform providers to cease operations their failure to fulfill
obligations leads to public harm.
The provider of an online food platform trading platform is
obligated to timely stop and report food safety violations to the food
authorities when a violation is made known to it.66 In case of serious
violation, the provider must stop providing further platform services to
the violator. Scenarios of serious violations include, among others, the
following circumstances: 1) online food business operators accused of
a crime relating to food safety are being investigated by public
security departments or prosecuted by procuratorate;67 2) online food
business operators are convicted of a crime relating to food safety by
court;68 3) online food business operators are held in detention
or punished with other administrative penalties by public security
66 See id. at art. 15 (requiring online third-party food trading platforms to cease
provision of services to online food traders and producers who are under investigation
for or are civilly or criminally liable for violations); see also id. at art. 37 (requiring
Food and Drug Administration officials to order third- party platform providers to
cease operations when providers’ failures cause serious foodborne illness, death, the
infringement of consumers’ rights and interests, or other serious consequences). See
also, 肖平辉[Pinghui Xiao], 互联网背景下食品安全治理研究[China’s Food
Safety Governance in the Age of the Internet Plus]
(知识产权出版
社[Intellectural Property Publishing House] 54 (2018).
67 Id. at art. 15.
68 Id.
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departments due to violation of food safety laws;69 and 4) online food
business operators are ordered to cease business operation or their
food licenses are revoked by food authorities.70
The provider of an online food platform trading platform shall
be ordered to cease operation and the case will be filed to
communications departments for investigation when failing to fulfill
relevant obligations cause the following serious consequences: 1)death
or serious injury, 2) serious food safety incidents, 3) serious foodborne
illness, 4) violating consumers’ legal rights and interests and causing
serious adverse social impacts.71
2. Special rules for online small food operators
According to the International Labour Organization, small
food business operators like street vendors absorb large numbers of
surplus labour. But there is a demand side as well. A mass of
consumers welcome street vendors because they provide consumers
with the accessibility to affordable goods and services. Therefore, it
can have positive impacts on poverty reduction, employment,
entrepreneurship, and social mobility to ensure the right to run small
businesses.72 Over the past thirty years, China’s urban population has
risen from 22.9% to 56.8% of its 1.3 billion people.73 China’s
urbanization has seen a large migrant population enter large and
medium-sized cities. “Currently, many people from the countryside
live in cities, but lack access to social services[,]” which means, for
instance, they have few jobs. That actually creates a barrier to social
stability.74 So job creation is of great importance to maintain the social
69

Id.

70

Id.

Id. at art. 37.
Kʏᴏᴋᴏ Kᴜꜱᴀᴋᴀᴋᴇ, Iɴᴛ’ʟ Lᴀʙᴏᴜʀ Oʀɢ., Pᴏʟɪᴄʏ Iꜱꜱᴜᴇꜱ ᴏɴ Sᴛʀᴇᴇᴛ Vᴇɴᴅɪɴɢ: Aɴ
Oᴠᴇʀᴠɪᴇᴡ ᴏꜰ Sᴛᴜᴅɪᴇꜱ ɪɴ Tʜᴀɪʟᴀɴᴅ, Cᴀᴍʙᴏᴅɪᴀ ᴀɴᴅ Mᴏɴɢᴏʟɪᴀ 3 (2006).
73 Brendan Ahern & Grant DePoyster, A Journey to the New Heart of Urbanization in
China, KʀᴀɴᴇSʜᴀʀᴇꜱ (Aug. 15, 2017), h ttps://kraneshares.com/a-journey-to-thenew-heart-of-urbanization-in-china/.
74 Sara Hsu, China’s Urbanization Plans Need To Move Faster In 2017, Fᴏʀʙᴇꜱ (Dec.
28, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2016/12/28/chinas-urbanizationplans-need-to-move-faster-in-2017/#6a58422174db.
71

72
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stability. China is now entering the age of the ubiquitous Internet.
The Chinese government has considered it a great means to
generate prosperity and jobs. In addition, it also treats online
platforms as a channel to nurture small businesses under the socalled Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation Campaign.75
Thus, small food businesses play an important role in
China. According to Jiangsu Province, among its 330,000 catering
service providers more than 70 percent are small businesses.76 As
China experienced rapid economic growth since its open policy, “it
also faced an accompanying [] widening income gap[,]” and there
is a lack of balanced regional development, due to stark differences
between coastal areas and rural regions.77 Considering all the above
factors, local governments are required to promulgate local rules to
administer small food workshops, food vendors, and other small
food business operators under the 2015 FSL Amendment.78 That
means China introduces a regulatory decentralization strategy to
regulation of small food business operation in considering local
circumstances. Simply put, rules and policies as applied to small
food workshops and food vendors, among other small food business
operators, vary from province to province.
Indeed, due to the decentralization approach to small food
business regulation, different provinces have introduced different
policies to regulate online small food businesses. Some advocate
full liberalization, while others totally prohibit small food operators
from doing business over the Internet. For instance, Hebei Province
关于大力推进大众创业万众创新若干政策措施的意见 [Opinions on Policy
Measures Implemented to Promote Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation], 国
务院 [State Council of the People’s Rep. of China] (2015); see China boosts
mass entrepreneurship and innovation, Sᴛᴀᴛᴇ Cᴏᴜɴᴄɪʟ ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Pᴇᴏᴘʟᴇ’ꜱ R ᴇ ᴘ . ᴏ ꜰ
Cʜɪɴᴀ (Jun. 16, 2015), http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2015/06/16/
content_281475128473681.htm (noting the government’s specific intents to promote
means to support Internet service providers, start-ups, and “platforms for innovative
technologies[.]”).
75

76丁冬[Dong Ding], 小餐饮立法与监管政策评析（上）[Analysis on legislation
and policy of small catering services industry (part one)], 中国医药报
[China
Pharmaceutical
News],
(Aug.
22,
2018).
77 Sara Hsu, High Income Inequality Still Festering In China, Fᴏʀʙᴇꜱ (Nov. 18,
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2016/11/18/high-income-inequality-stillfestering-in-china/#571e0e291e50.
78 Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 36.
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promulgated local rules allowing small food business operators
including small workshops, vendors and small restaurants to sell
foods and provide catering services via the Internet.79 Those small
food operators can enter online platforms to do business after realname registration.80 Guangdong Province, however, does not allow
small workshops to sell the foods produced thereby over the
Internet.81 That piecemeal approach creates a challenge for online
small food business operators and online food platforms. For
instance, foods produced in small workshops in Hebei can be
legally sold in this province over the Internet. However, if they are
sold to consumers in Guangdong over the Internet, they can be
considered illegal according to rules as established in Guangdong.82
Taken together, small food businesses, including small workshops
and small restaurants, which trade foods over the Internet are
encouraged to respect but are not required to abide by the Online
Food Measures enacted by CFDA, which is regarded as a national
rule applied throughout the entire country.83
B. Regulating food e-commerce under the E-commerce
Law cluster
The E-commerce Law created the term ‘e-commerce
business operators’, which denotes natural persons, legal persons,
or organizations without the status of legal person that engage
in the business activities of selling commodities, or providing
services, through the Internet or any other information network.
Here e-commerce business operators comprise: 1) e-commerce
platform business operators, 2) in-platform business operators, and
3) e-commerce business operators that sell commodities or provide
79 河北省食品小作坊小餐饮小摊点管理条例[Regulation
of
Small
Food
Workshops, Small Canteens and Food Vendors in Hebei] (Hebei People’s
Congress Standing Committee), art. 17 (2016).
80 Id.
81 China’s food safety governance in the age of the Internet Plus, supra note
27, at 299.
82 Id. at 303.
83 Measures for Investigation, supra note 71, at art. 46.
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services through a self-built website or any other network services.84
Of note is that ‘business operators’ are used in a very broad sense here,
so platform providers are considered e-commerce business operators.
In comparison, the 2015 FSL Amendment, through its provisions
relating to online food trading, make it clear that food business
operators are intentionally distinguished from platform providers.
It further implies that providing platform services is not regarded as a
business operation.85 In other words, the 2015 FSL Amendment treats
food business operators in a narrow sense, and online food platforms
are not considered food business operators. Taken together, the term
‘platform providers’ in the 2015 FSL Amendment and that of
‘platform business operators’ in the E-commerce Law both recognize
platforms are run as third-party entities to provide services, though the
interpretation of ‘business operation’ is treated in a different manner in
these two laws. Nevertheless, the E-commerce Law recognizes the
special characteristics of platforms. So an ‘e-commerce platform
business operator’ is especially defined as a legal person, or an
organization without the status of legal person. The platform provides
multiple parties with services, such as online places of business,
match-making, and releasing information, for them to independently
conduct trading activities.86 Simply put, e-commerce platform business
operators are articulated to be different from other e-commerce
business operators, e.g., those directly selling goods and providing
services to consumers. The above observation is equivalent to saying
that, as far as e-commerce as defined in the E-commerce Law and
online food trading as described in the 2015 FSL Amendment are
concerned, ‘e-commerce platform business operators’ are similar, if
not identical to ‘online platform providers.’
Similarly, the law recognizes the co-governance principle
as previously established in the 2015 FSL Amendment. China is
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dianzishangwu Fa 中华人民共和国电子商务法 [Ecommerce Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2018, effective Jan. 1, 2019), 2018 Cʜɪɴᴀ Lᴀᴡ
LEXIS 633, art. 9 [hereinafter E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China].
85 See Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 62
(describing the requirements of third-party platforms).
86 E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 9.
84
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dedicated to establishing a collaborative regulatory system in line with
the characteristics of e-commerce and promoting the formation of an
e-commerce market governance system jointly participated in by
relevant authorities, e-commerce industry associations, e-commerce
businesses, and consumers, among others, so e-commerce platforms
are treated as a co-regulators of e-commerce under the E-commerce
Law.87 The law creates a collaborative governance scenario, in which
e-commerce platform business operators play a key role in regulation
of e-commerce. In addition, the E-commerce Law also created
the term ‘in-platform business operator’ to denote an e-commerce
business which sells commodities or provides services through an
e-commerce platform, which is different from an e-commerce operator
through self-built websites.88 Like in the 2015 FSL Amendment
cluster, special rules were created for the purpose of small ecommerce businesses under the E-commerce Law.89
1. Obligations for e-commerce platform business operators
Under the E-commerce Law, similar to the 2015 FSL
Amendment, the e-commerce platform business operators are obliged
to ensure that in-platform business operators are in conformity with
law. To this end, provisions for purposes of both entry control and
process control mechanisms are created.
1.1 Entry control obligations
Under the law, the in-platform business operator is obliged to
submit information including its identity, address, contact information,
and administrative licensing to the platform business operator. In
addition, the platform business operator shall establish a register, and
make regular updates and inspection of the above information.90 For

87
88
89
90

Id. at art 7.
Id. at art. 9.
Id. at art. 71.
Id. at art. 27.
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those individuals who are eligible to conduct e-commerce activities
and can be exempted from ICRs, e.g., a farmer selling agricultural or
sideline products produced by him or herself, the platform will have to
at least verify and keep a record of basic information of those
individuals, whereas in the case of in-platform business operators
operating as legal persons or organizations without the status of legal
person, on top of that information, the platform will also have to verify
and keep a record of business licenses.91 Of note is that a co-regulation
scenario is applied here, in which both e-commerce regulatory
authorities and platform business operators play a role. Simply put, the
e-commerce regulatory authorities issue all kinds of business licenses
and the platform business operators will have to inspect the above
licenses as required by the law so they are complementary to each
other in this context.92
When an e-commerce platform business operator provides
services for non-business users selling commodities or provides
services in the platform, the e-commerce platform business operator
shall observe the relevant provisions in this Section.93 Here, ‘nonbusiness users’ largely denotes those second-hand goods or occasional
sellers who are not regular business operators and thus exempted from
business licenses. For safety and security purposes, platform business
operators will have to collect their information before they are allowed
to conduct e-commerce activities within the platforms.94
The e-commerce platform business operator shall submit
the identity information of in-platform business operators to the
administrative authorities of market regulation as required and remind
any in-platform business operator that has not obtained ICRs to file for
application from relevant public authorities as required by the law. In
this case, it will cooperate with the administrative authorities of market
regulation and offer help to in-platform business operator to file for
91

Id.

Zhao], 中华人民共和国电子商务法释义与原 [Interpretation
and Principles of the E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (中国法制出版社[China Legal Publishing House]. 2018).156-7.
93 E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 27.
94 赵旭东[Xudong Zhao], supra note 104, at 157.
92 赵旭东[Xudong
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ICRs.95 E-commerce platform business operators are required to
share information collected from those in-platform business
operators with public authorities to better regulate e-commerce.96 In
addition, an e-commerce platform business operator shall submit the
identity information and the information related to tax payment of inplatform business operators to the taxation authorities.97 In the third
reading of the draft E-commerce Law, platform business operators
were even required to submit information of e-commerce business
activities to the taxation authorities on top of identity information. But
the information of e-commerce business activities can be interpreted
so loosely that even trade secrets and like information can be included,
which is not implementable in practice. So the idea of including
information of e-commerce business activities was ultimately
discarded.98
1.2 Process control obligations
The E-commerce Law enforces all kinds of process control
measures, which require e-commerce platform business operators to
serve as a qualified supervisor of in-platform business operators in a
relatively all-encompassing struggle against e-commerce industry in
compliance. To this end, platform business operators are required to
take a few process control measures relating to monitoring, technical
requirements, business transaction recordation, platform rule-making
and anti-manipulation, among other things.99
First, platform business operators are required to take
measures to monitor certain e-commerce activities as conducted by inplatform business operators and take relevant measures when needed.
All e-commerce business operators are required by the Law to obtain
relevant administrative licensing.100 In addition, an e-commerce
E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 28.
赵旭东[Xudong Zhao], supra note 104, at 162.
97 E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 28.
98 赵旭东[Xudong Zhao], supra note 104, at 162.
99 E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97.
100 Id. at art. 12.
95

96
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business operator should not sell commodities or provide services
which do not meet the requirements for guaranteeing personal and
property safety and for environmental protection and shall not
sell or provide commodities or services the trading of which is
prohibited by any law or administrative regulation.101 Where an ecommerce platform business operator discovers that any information
on commodities or services in its platform fails under any above
circumstances, it shall take necessary disposition measures in
accordance with the law and report to the relevant competent
authorities.102 Necessary disposition measures include, but are not
limited to, stopping the violation in a timely manner and ceasing
providing online trading platform services. The former is applied
in cases of any minor violation and the latter for any serious illegal
act. More importantly, the platform has an obligation to report the
violation to the authorities and provide relevant information when
necessary. Here the information to be provided is so comprehensive
that it can include identity, e-commerce business activities, and
the like.103 It is of importance to note that an e-commerce platform
business operator serving as a private regulator can take measures,
such as warning and suspension or termination of services, against an
in-platform business in violation of any law or regulation. The
platform business operators act this way according to the prior
platform service agreement and transaction rules as established
between the platform and in-platform business operators, and timely
publication shall be made in that scenario.104
Second, there are certain technical requirements, which
platform business operators must meet. An e-commerce platform
business shall take technological measures and other necessary
measures to ensure its cyber security and stable operation, prevent
online illegal and criminal activities, effectively tackle cyber security
events, and guarantee e-commerce trading security.105 Cyber security
Id. at art. 13.
Id. at art. 29.
103 赵旭东[Xudong Zhao], supra note 104, at 166.
104 E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 36.
105 Id. at art. 30
101

102
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became a top priority in China, and China’s first Cyber Security Law
was promulgated to tackle ever-increasing hacker attacks and
cybercrime in 2016.106 According to the law, the Internet is regarded as
an infrastructure of great importance for economic development. It
further contends that cyberspace, if the country loses control of it, can
endanger national security.107 The law creates the term ‘critical
information infrastructure’, which is so broad that it encompasses both
traditional critical sectors like power and transport as well as other
infrastructure which could likely harm the people’s livelihoods. As the
Financial Times reported, even online catering platforms could be
considered critical infrastructure.108 The Law requires that any entity
considered a critical information infrastructure, together with those
companies having significant amounts of information on Chinese
citizens, should take responsibility to ensure cyber security.109 Simply
put, e-commerce platforms, including online catering platforms, can
be regarded as critical infrastructure, so platform business providers
are required to take technical measures to ensure the safe and stable
operation of the platforms and prevent illegal criminal activities
therein.110
Third, platform business operators are required to keep
a record of information of business transactions. An e-commerce
platform business operator shall record and retain information on the
commodities and services and transaction information released in the
platform and ensure the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of
the information. The information on commodities, services, and
106 Zhonghua Renmin Gongeguo Wangluo Anquan Fa中华人民共和国网络安全法
[Cyber Security Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong, Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 2017), 2016
Cʜɪɴᴀ Lᴀᴡ Lᴇxɪꜱ 1398.
107 Id. at art. 1.
108 Mirren Gidda, China’s New Cybersecurity Law Could Cost Foreign Companies
Their Ideas, Newsweek (May 31, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/
china-cybersecurity-hacking-intellectual-property-multinationals-618345.
109 Carly Ramsey & Ben Wootliff, China’s Cyber Security Law: The Impossibility
of Compliance?, FORBES (May 29, 2017, 3:29 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/riskmap/2017/05/29/chinas-cyber-security-law-theimpossibility-of-compliance/#157cb17b471c.
110 Brian Marterer, China’s New E-commerce Food Safety Measures, PWC, https://
www.pwccn.com/en/food-supply/publications/china-new-e-commerce-food-safetymeasures/cfda-measures-for-e-commerce-food-safety.pdf (last visited Dec. 14,
2018).
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transactions shall be retained for at least three years from the day of
completion of the transaction, unless otherwise provided by any law
or administrative regulation.111 Of note is that the information kept
here is different from the information required during the entry
control in the sense that the former is about business transactions
whereas the latter concerns identity. The information of business
transactions can be divided into two types, namely information of
commodities as sold and services as provided within the platform,
first, and trading information, second.112
Fourth, agreements and platform rules, which platform
business operators are entitled to introduce will have to meet certain
criteria. Online platforms, including e-commerce platforms, are
engines for growth and innovation. To create a good environment for
platforms to scale up, they are recognized as a private legislator to lay
down certain platform rules, which in-platform business operators will
have to comply with. Nevertheless, generally speaking, agreements
and platform rules from the platforms are considered contractual
terms, which have to be negotiated and agreed by both parties to a
certain contract. Because platforms can be incredibly powerful, they
may have the ability to manipulate their power to lay down unfair
terms. To avoid manipulation by the platforms, China created a
lifecycle interference mechanism to prevent potential manipulation. In
general, there are quite a few principles for platform rule-making.113
An e-commerce platform business operator shall abide by the
principles of openness, equity, and impartiality; develop a platform
service agreement and transaction rules; and specify the rights and
obligations in aspects such as joining and leaving the platform,
assurance of the quality of commodities and services, protection
of consumer rights and interests, and protection of individual
information.114
In addition, there are quite a few procedural requirements to
be fulfilled by platforms when making platform rules. For instance, an
111

31.

E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art.

Id. at art. 2.
Id. at art. 32.
114 Id.
112
113
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e-commerce platform business operator shall continuously publish the
information regarding its platform service agreement and transaction
rules, or the mark of the link to the aforesaid information, at a
conspicuous place of its homepage to ensure the easy and complete
reading and download by businesses and consumers.115 Another good
example can be explained in the following circumstances. An ecommerce platform business operator is obliged, when amending its
platform service agreement or transaction rules, to ask for public
opinion at a conspicuous place of its homepage and take reasonable
measures to ensure that each side is able to express opinions in a
timely manner. The amendment shall be published at least seven days
prior to its entry into force.116
Fifth, there is an anti-manipulation mechanism created to
prevent abuse of market power from platforms. Market power occurs
if a company has a significant share of the market, and many online
platforms including e-commerce ones in China are unicorns in certain
fields, which then enables them to use their technology and other
powerful means to abuse market power, which in a way constitutes a
violation of anti-monopoly and anti-unfair competition laws.117 An ecommerce platform business operator shall not, by means such as
service terms, transaction rules, and technology, unreasonably restrict,
or additionally set unreasonable conditions against the transactions and
trading prices of an in-platform business operator in the platform, or its
transactions with other businesses, or collect unreasonable fees from an
in-platform business operator.118
2. Special rules for small e-commerce businesses
An e-commerce business shall apply for an ICR, but the
following are exempt from this obligation: 1)those individuals, selling
Id. at art. 33.
Id. at art. 34.
117 Chen Xinlei, China’s Digital Monopolies are Killing Competition and Need to be
Regulated, Sᴏᴜᴛʜ Cʜɪɴᴀ Mᴏʀɴɪɴɢ Pᴏꜱᴛ (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.scmp.com/
comment/insight-opinion/article/1850448/chinas-digital-monopolies-are-killingcompetition-and-need.
118 E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 35.
115
116
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agricultural or sideline products produced by them; 2) those selling
products of a cottage industry; 3) those use their own skills to engage
in public convenience services; 4) occasional and low-value
transactions, for which no license is required by the law; or 5) those
specified unless an ICR is not required by laws or administrative
regulations.119
In 2018, China announced the Strategic Plan for Rural
Revitalization (2018-2022).120 Rural areas are encouraged to take full
advantage of e-commerce and ‘Internet Plus’ to strengthen agricultural
product brand marketing. Internet companies are encouraged
to establish agricultural service platforms to help better market
agricultural products. China is dedicated to promoting e-commerce in
rural areas and building extensive infrastructure for the development
of e-commerce there.121 All the factors combined indicate that farmers
in rural areas can have greater opportunities to sell agricultural
products produced by themselves, including fresh produce, fruits and
vegetables, and Chinese medical herbs via the Internet.122 At present,
the e-commerce market is saturated in cities, whereas there is much
room in rural areas.
Social media platforms like Webo and WeChat in China are
ubiquitous and widely used in China, which due to their large user
body, generate a hybrid type of e-commerce, namely social media
e-commerce. Most social media users are individuals, so e-commerce
business operators in social media platforms are individuals, and they
are labeled as a ‘Micro Business’ in China, which connotes small
businesses conducted in an informal way.123
Id. at art. 10.
Guo Yiming, Rural Revitalization Highlighted at Two Sessions, Cʜɪɴᴀ.Oʀɢ.CN
(Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.china.org.cn/china/NPC_CPPCC_2018/2018-03/05/
content_50659387.htm.
121 Id.
122 See Teresa Schroeder, Chinese Regulation of Traditional Chinese Medicine in the
Modern World: Can the Chinese Effectively Profit From One of Their Most Valuable
Cultural Resources?, 11 Pᴀᴄ.. Rɪᴍ. L. & Pᴏʟ. J. 687, 709 (2002) (discussing China’s
regulations for online marketing of medicinal herbs which qualify as Traditional
Chinese Medicine, as opposed to medicinal herbs farmers can market as edible
agricultural products).
123 Pinghui Xiao, Legislative Development of Feed E- commerce Regulation in
China, 13 Eᴜʀ. Fᴏᴏᴅ & Fᴇᴇᴅ L. Rᴇᴠ. 313, 321–22 (2018) [hereinafter Legislative
Development of Feed E- commerce Regulation in China].
119

120
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III. REGULATING CHINA’S FOOD
E-COMMERCE: HARMONIZATION OF LAWS
As observed by Fortin, an administrative agency in the U.S.
can serve as the legislator, the prosecutor and the judge, ‘all rolled
into one’, which creates open debate on the legality of these powerful
agencies. To prevent abuse of power, the U.S., however, limits these
agencies to stringent procedural requirements coupled with court
review mechanisms.124 For a long time, online platforms in China also
acted like a three-in-one entity with powers of private rule-making,
execution, and dispute settlement, and therefore, similarly, questions
arise as to whether or not this is acceptable and how the platforms can
be better controlled.125 Interestingly, the Chinese government did not
intervene in this Internet economy ecosystem, but actually created
a relatively loose and supportive market policy environment during
the early stages of Internet development. The Chinese government
understands that the concentration of these powers in online platforms
in that way could make Chinese platform economy scale up to be
competitive in the world. This idea can be seen in policy documents of
China’s ‘Internet Plus’ Strategy in the course of China’s digitalization
movement.126 However, there is an issue of harmonization between the
2015 FSL Amendment and the E-commerce Law.

124 N. D. Fortin, Food Regulation: Law, Science, Policy, and Practice 10 (Wiley

ed., 2nd ed. 2017).
Legislative Development of Feed E- commerce Regulation in China, supra note
135, at 320.
126 For instance, the State Council announced a policy document stating that the
Chinese government is dedicated to ‘cultivating’ Internet platforms with global
influence. To this end, the enterprises will be hoped to play a key role in establishing
of an &quot;Internet +&quot; industrial innovation network or industrial technology
innovation alliance, which is a joint undertaking by enterprises, industries, universities
and research institutes. The leading enterprises are the main driver to create innovative
platforms. To achieve these goals, the Chinese government is committed to breaking
down industry barriers to lay a great foundation for the Internet industry to scale up.
See 国务院关于积极推进“互联网＋”行动的指导意见 [Guiding Opinions of the State
Council on Actively Promoting the “Internet Plus” Strategy] (2015), http://www.gov.
cn/zhengce/content/2015-07/04/content_10002.htm.
125
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A. Harmonization of definitions and liabilities
For a long time, in practice, food e-commerce and online food
trading have been considered two interchangeable notions in China.127
However, when the E-commerce Law was enacted in August 2018,
the legal interpretation of these two terms faced challenges.
Under the E-commerce Law, e-commerce is defined to
contain ‘any business activities of selling commodities or providing
services via the Internet or any other information network.’128
However, under the 2015 FSL Amendment, the term ‘online trading,’
rather than ‘e-commerce,’ is used, and ‘online trading’ is left
undefined.129 Horizontally, both the E-commerce Law and the 2015
FSL Amendment belong to the same level of laws enacted by the
Standing Committee of the NPC. Simply put, according to the
Legislation Law, neither law is subordinate to the other.130 In theory
then, the E-commerce Law, in defining the term of ‘e-commerce’
seems to produce more legal predictability and certainty than the 2015
FSL Amendment, which does not provide a definition of ‘online
trading’. Professor Gao Fuping argued that since China enacted
Electronic Signature Law in 2004, for the purpose of not confusing the
E-commerce Law with this Law, China should introduce an Internet
Commerce Law or an Online Commerce Law rather than the Ecommerce Law.131 Of note is that according to some scholars, the
127 Pinghui Xiao, Legislative Development of Feed E-commerce Regulation in China,
13 Eᴜʀ. Fᴏᴏᴅ & Fᴇᴇᴅ L. Rᴇᴠ. 313, 313 n.1 (2018).
128 E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 2.
129 See generally Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at
art. 62 (mentioning “online trading” but not defining “online trading”).
130 中华人民共和国立法法（2015) 年修订 [Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of
China (Amended in 2015)] § President Order No 20 全国人大常委会 (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Mar. 15, 2000, effective Jul. 1, 2000), https://
www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/legislation-law-chinese-and-english-text.
“There are four levels of laws and rules in China, namely, laws enacted by the NPC;
administrative regulations promulgated by the State Council; local regulations enacted
by local government; and rules introduced by all kinds of ministries affiliated with the
State Council and departments of local government.” See Pinghui Xiao, Legislative
Development of Feed E- commerce Regulation in China, 13 Eᴜʀ. Fᴏᴏᴅ & Fᴇᴇᴅ L.
Rᴇᴠ. 313, 316 n.29 (2018).
131 高富平[Fuping Gao], 从电子商务法到网络商务法—关于我国电子商务立法定位
的思考 [From e - commerce law to online commerce law: A study of direction of
e-commerce legislation in China], 法学[Law Science] 145–46 (2014).
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term of ‘online trading’ can be found in some administrative rules
enacted by SAIC. For instance, the Measures for Online Trading was
promulgated to regulate goods sold and services provided via the
Internet in 2014.132 In other words, ‘online trading’ has been
a pre-existing legal term before the introduction of the 2015 FSL
Amendment in 2015 and the E-commerce Law in 2018. Other scholars
have implies that China should have introduced an Online Trading
Law rather than the E-commerce Law.133 The E-commerce Law,
recognizes the doctrine of lex specialis, which has been endorsed
in the Legislation Law by stipulating that “where any other law or
administrative regulation provides rules for the sale of commodities or
provision of services, such other law or administrative regulation shall
apply.”134 Moreover, some scholars, by pointing out this provision,
hold that the 2015 FSL Amendment is a special e-commerce law
whereas the E-commerce Law is a general e-commerce law.135 If that
is the case, it actually produces a paradox situation.
As far as online platforms are concerned, things become more
complicated. The long-winded legal term, ‘online third-party food
trading platform provider’ as mentioned early under the 2015 FSL

132 See 个体工商户登记管理办法 (2014修订) [Measures for the Administration of
Registration of Individual Industrial and Commercial Households (2014 Revised)]
(2014) (implementing measures “to standardize online commodity trading and
related services, protect consumers’ and operators’ legitimate rights and interests and
promote the sustainable and healthy development of [the] online economy”).

李一笑[Yixiao Li], 网络交易平台间接侵权之相关问题分析——以利益平衡为中心的
考量 [Analyses of several problems about the online marketplaces’ indirect liabilities:
From the perpective of balance of interests]
, 网络法律评论[Internet Law Review] 74-5
(2016).

133

134 E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 2. As for
the doctrine of lex specialis, according to the Legislation Law, for laws, administrative
regulations, local regulations, autonomous regulations, separate regulations, or rules
developed by the same authority, if there is any discrepancy between special provisions
and general provisions, special provisions shall prevail. See 中华人民共和国食品安全法
2015 年修订[Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (Amended in
2015) art. 92] (2009) (China).

See e.g., 陆悦[Yue Lu], 网络食品合规治理再上层楼：当食品行业遇见《电子商务
法》[Online food trading regulation: China’s food industry in the age of E-commerce
Law], 中国医药报[China Pharmaceutical News], (Sept. 20, 2018) 王峰[Feng Wang],
滴滴顺风车案改写电商立法 平台违法或承担刑事责任 [Didi scandal
restructures the E-commerce Law: platforms may assume criminal responsibilities], 21
available at http://www.21jingji.com/2018/9-1/2NMDEzNzlfMTQ0NzE2NQ.html 世纪经济报道
[21 Century News](2018), (last visited Dec. 11, 2018).
135
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Amendment is undefined.136 Nevertheless, the term ‘online food
platform provider’ is intentionally created with a view to
distinguishing responsibilities and liabilities of platform providers
from those of food business operators doing businesses within the
platforms. That actually delivers a fundamental idea that a platform is a
technologically-neutral intermediary, and that essentially “means that
the provider of a platform [is treated] as a third-party entity[, who]
should not be responsible for, or only in a limited way responsible for,
any wrongdoings from [those] using the platform.”137 Online food
platforms play a big role in shaping business modes and models of
online food trading in China.138 The 2015 FSL Amendment implies that
business models of online food trading can be divided into
two main types, namely, self-built models and platform models.139
Later measures enacted by the CFDA also explicitly confirm the above
idea.140 In the course of China’s introduction of the 2015 FSL
Amendment, WeChat, among other social media platforms, raised a
compelling argument that social media platforms should not be treated
as online food platforms in the sense that social media platforms are
meant to be used as a communication tool rather than a trading one.
However, the so-called ‘Micro Business’ involving individuals and
SMEs selling foods via social media platforms has become a rising
phenomenon in China, creating a form of so-called social media
e-commerce.141 When China introduced the 2015 FSL Amendment
it also launched Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation Campaign, as
mentioned earlier, to boost employment, and the Internet is considered
a great means to generate prosperity and jobs.142 Largely due to this,
136 See Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art. 62
(creating obligations for “third-party online food trading platform[s]” but providing no
specific definition for the term).
137 Pinghui Xiao, Legislative Development of Feed E-commerce Regulation in China,
13 Eᴜʀ. Fᴏᴏᴅ & Fᴇᴇᴅ L. Rᴇᴠ., 313, 317 (2018).
138 Pɪɴɢʜᴜɪ Xɪᴀᴏ, Cʜɪɴᴀ›ꜱ Rɪꜱɪɴɢ Oɴʟɪɴᴇ Fᴏᴏᴅ Tʀᴀᴅɪɴɢ: Iᴛꜱ Iᴍᴘʟɪᴄᴀᴛɪᴏɴꜱ Fᴏʀ ᴛʜᴇ
Rᴇꜱᴛ ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Wᴏʀʟᴅ 125–27 (Xinting Jia & Roman Tomasic eds., 2017).
139 Pinghui Xiao, China’s Wine and Liquor Laws in the “Internet Plus” Age, 1 Jus Vin
Law 36 (2018).
140 Legislative Development of Feed E-commerce Regulation in China, supra note
149, at 318.
141 See e.g., id. at 321–22
.
142 YueZhang,Nation to boost entrepreneurship, innovation, Cʜɪɴᴀ Dᴀɪʟʏ (Sept. 7,
2018,
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undefined online platforms can leave more room for employment
and better environment for innovation. However, when it comes to the
E-commerce Law, because e-commerce is defined, which makes it
predictable, the term ‘e-commerce platform’ can be equally
predictable. By interpretation, it is safe to say that in this law that ecommerce platforms can be so extensive that the E-commerce Law is
applied to social media platforms and mobile applications. Therefore,
it further implies that the platform obligations as laid down in the Ecommerce Law, are applied to those social media platforms involving
food SMEs and ‘Micro Business’, which however, is very much
contestable under the 2015 FSL Amendment cluster.
While the harmonization of definitions can produce consistent
legal predictability as far as the question of what platforms should take
what responsibility is concerned, there is a further issue relating to
harmonization of liabilities as laid down in the 2015 FSL Amendment
and the E-commerce Law.
Under the 2015 FSL Amendment, where the provider of
an online food platform, in violation of this law, fails to assume the
supervision tasks required by the law, which results in food business
operators’ failure in food safety compliance, food authorities at
or above the county level shall order it to take corrective action,
confiscate its illegal income, and impose a fine of not less than RMB
50,000 but not more than RMB 200,000 on it. However, under the Ecommerce Law, where an e-commerce platform business operator fails
to take necessary measures to ensure in-platform business operator
conducts e-commerce lawfully, relevant authorities shall order the ecommerce platform business operator to take corrective action within a
specified period and may fine it not less than RMB 50,000 not more
than RMB 500,000; or if the circumstances are serious, it shall be
ordered to suspend business for rectification, in addition to a fine not
less than RMB 500,000 but not more than RMB 2, 000,000.143 In terms
of the fine intervals, the two laws vary greatly, which creates a
question of how the administrative penalties should be applied as far as
8:54 AM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201809/07WS5b91cc35a31033b4f4654b65.
html.
143 E-c ommerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 83.
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online food platforms are concerned.
As far as online food platform liabilities are concerned, all
the above factors combined create a few open questions: 1) should a
social media platform, when used to trade in foods, be treated as an
online food platform in the 2015 FSL Amendment or an e-commerce
platform business operator under the E-commerce Law? 2) when an
online food platform fails to assume supervision tasks as required by
the law, should an administrative fine ranging from RMB 50,000 to
RMB 200,000 under 2015 FSL Amendment be imposed upon the
platform or should a fine ranging from 50,000 to RMB 2,000,000 be
imposed upon it? In other words, there is a need for further
harmonization.
B. Harmonization of legislative aims and missions
It is necessary to examine the aims of different pieces of
legislation at the outset in the sense that in most Chinese laws, their
missions will be clearly articulated at the very beginning, upon which
the directions of the laws in question will be largely based. We find
varying missions in laws relating to food regulation. For instance, the
E-commerce Law has two concurrent missions, namely, 1) to
safeguard the lawful rights and interests of all parties to e-commerce,
to regulate e-commerce conduct, and to maintain the market order,
and 2) to promote the sustainable and sound development of
e-commerce.144 But in the 2015 FSL Amendment, there is only one
mission, and that is to ensure food safety and protect the physical
health and life safety of the public.145 Questions arise as to whether
there are conflicts between protecting human health on the one hand
and promoting economy on the other. Admittedly, there are conflicts
between protecting health and safety and promoting industry in the
144 See id. at art. 1. (drawing similarities to the E-commerce Law, the Law on Agriproduct Quality and Safety with the establishment of two concurrent missions,
namely, to protect human health on one hand and to promote rural economy on the
other); See e.g., Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Nong Chan Pin Zhi Liang An
Quan Fa ( 中华人民共和国农产品质量安全法) [Law on Agri-product Quality and
Safety of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 2006, effective Nov. 1, 2006), art. 1.].
145 Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 43, at art 1.
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sense that we have past lessons and repeated bad examples in this
regard, taking the BSE crisis in Europe and Melamine Milk Scandal in
China into consideration.146 These two incidents have to do with agrifood production, vividly showing conflicts that can occur when public
agencies concurrently play a dual role in both industry promotion and
health protection.
The conflicting aims and missions in the food e-commerce
related legislation make harmonization of these laws an issue. The
needs for harmonization in this regard are two-fold.
First, we have a within-law harmonization scenario. Because
the E-commerce Law, simultaneously is aimed at regulation and
industry promotion, there is a question of harmonizing those provisions
bearing different missions within the same law. For example, the
whole Chapter V, containing ten articles, is dedicated to promoting ecommerce through various mechanisms and schemes.147 Numerous
provisions
relate
to
food
e-commerce
promotion
as
well, which very much involves small businesses and even ‘Micro
Business’ as mentioned earlier. However, as far as agri-foods are
concerned, “the state shall promote the application of Internet
technologies in agricultural production, processing, and circulation[;]”
encourage various social resources to strengthen cooperation; and
promote the development of rural e-commerce.148 It is hoped that
e-commerce can play a role in poverty alleviation.149 Many agri-food
operators are small businesses in China. For instance, farmers sell agrifoods produced in their own farms. Farmers in rural areas in China are
relatively poor with limited job opportunities, and therefore agriculture
becomes their main tools to generate wealth and prosperity. In
addition, farmers are exempted from an ICR if they sell agricultural or
sideline products produced in their farms over the Internet, for which
no licenses are required by the law.150 These provisions relating to
See e.g., Pinghui Xiao, China’s Milk Scandals and Its Food Risk Assessment
Institutional Framework, 2 Eur’n. J. Risk Reg. 397 (2011); Pinghui Xiao,
China’s Food Standardization System, Its Reform and Remaining Challenges, 3
Eur’n. J. Risk Reg. 507 (2012).
147 See E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97.
148 Id. at art. 68.
149 Id.
146
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agri-food e-commerce are created for the purpose of rural
development. However, questions arise as to how these provisions
will be harmonized with other e-commerce regulatory provisions
within the E-commerce Law. There is a question as to which side,
industry promotion or regulation, shall prevail when there are
conflicts.
Second, there is a between-law scenario harmonization. As for
cross-border food e-commerce, it is even trickier. As observed by the
OECD, the spread of the digital economy e.g., cross-border
e-commerce poses challenges for international taxation.151 But
the ever-increasing cross-border e-commerce is regarded as ‘an engine
for growth’.152 And it is highly recognized by the Chinese government.
Hence, the E-commerce Law stipulates that, the state shall promote
cross-border
e-commerce
development;
establish
and improve administrative systems for customs, taxation, entry
and exit inspection, and quarantine, among others, in line with the
characteristics of cross-border e-commerce; and streamline procedures
to facilitate cross-border e-commerce. Cross-border e-commerce
platforms are encouraged to provide storage and logistics, customs
declaration, inspection and quarantine declaration, and other services
for cross-border e-commerce. The state shall support micro and smallsized enterprises in engaging in cross-border e-commerce.153 For these
product categories through cross-border e-commerce, the most popular
among Chinese consumers are baby products, foods and cosmetics.
This is largely due to domestic safety scandals and incidents in recent
years.154 Quite a few business models of cross-border e-commerce
emerge, among which the model of so-called ‘bonded warehouses’
goes like this: goods produced and marketed in a certain jurisdiction
are shipped to Chinese consumers in China through Internet order.
Id. at art. 10.
Aᴅᴅʀᴇꜱꜱɪɴɢ ᴛʜᴇ Tᴀx Cʜᴀʟʟᴇɴɢᴇꜱ ᴏꜰ ᴛʜᴇ Dɪɢɪᴛᴀʟ Eᴄᴏɴᴏᴍʏ, ACTION 1: 2015
Fɪɴᴀʟ Rᴇᴘᴏʀt, OECD (2015).
152 Global Express Association, Let cross-border e-commerce be an engine for
growth, WCO Nᴇᴡꜱ Mᴀɢᴀᴢɪɴᴇ, (Oct. 2015) at 50.
153 E-commerce Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 97, at art. 71.
154 Anthony De Gennaro, China Cross-Border E-Commerce: New Challenges &
Opportunities 2017, Dʀᴀɢᴏɴ Sᴏᴄɪᴀʟ (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.dragonsocial.net/
blog/china-cross-border-ecommerce/.
150
151
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These bonded warehouses, specifically purposed for storing
overseas goods, allow merchants to bulk-ship products to China in
private order over the Internet without necessarily being subjected to
commercial import duties or strict quality control measures.155 Under
the above provisions as laid down in the E-commerce Law, the model
of bonded warehouses should not be a problem, since it is done in the
name of cross-border e-commerce. Nevertheless, this act may violate
the 2015 FSL Amendment. Because those foods are produced and
marketed in other jurisdictions according to food laws thereof, they
are not necessarily in compliance with Chinese food safety standards.
Hence, according to the 2015 FSL Amendment, the foods in question
may violate Chinese food safety requirements, so they should not have
been allowed to be shipped to Chinese consumers. The tricky thing is,
that to date there have been quite a few cases relating to cross-border
food e-commerce through bonded warehouses, in which some court
decisions have upheld the 2015 FSL Amendment, but others have
been overturned. This makes harmonization of these two laws an open
question in the future.
IV. CONCLUSION
China has created a unique regulatory mechanism in which
online platforms, considered third-party business entities, are
obligated to monitor and supervise food business operators within the
platforms. In other words, platforms are treated as co-regulators of
food e-commerce. Through the lens of examination of legislative
development, we find that online platforms are the key players for
food e-commerce regulation, which are required to supervise online
food business operators within the platforms. Online food platforms,
though, as private players should co-regulate online food safety in
close cooperation with government agencies. In case of any food
safety non-compliance issues from the online food operators, the
online platforms may be jointly punished by government agencies.
This approach, though contestable, reflects the principle of co155

Id.
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governance as adopted in 2015 FSL Amendment cluster and is further
recognized as so-called collaborative governance under the Ecommerce Law cluster. In other words, it creates a public-private coregulation scenario, which is a recognized practice in both law
clusters.
Nevertheless, there is a challenge for harmonization of laws in
terms of food e-commerce regulation, in which there are two facets to
be considered. The first is concerning harmonization of definitions and
resulting liabilities. While the harmonization of definitions can
produce consistent legal predictability as far as the question of what
platforms should take which responsibility is concerned, as a result
there is a further issue relating to harmonization of liabilities as
laid down in the 2015 FSL Amendment and the E-commerce Law. The
second harmonization facet is concerning legislative aims and
missions. The conflicting aims and missions as appearing in various
pieces of legislation relating to food e-commerce make harmonization
of these laws an issue.
In March 2018, the Chinese Central Government announced a
mega reform scheme, in which CFDA will be merged into SAIC and
another Ministry to create a new agency called State Administration
for Market Regulation. It will be the implementing agency of the
E-commerce Law and the 2015 FSL Amendment to regulate food
e-commerce.156 It remains to be seen what impact this institutional
reform will have upon harmonization of laws towards a better
regulation of food e-commerce in China.

韩韩江 [Han Shengjiang], 国家市场监督管理总局正式成立，张茅任局长毕井泉
任党组书记 [State Administration for Market Regulation is established, and Zhang
Mao is Minister whereas Bi Jingquan is secretary of the Leading Party Members’
Group], 澎湃 [Tʜᴇ Pᴀᴘᴇʀ] (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_
forward_2036753.
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The Global Food Security Act: America’s Strategic Approach to
Combatting World Hunger
Michael Adkins1
I. Introduction
The world’s farms currently produce enough calories to adequately feed everyone on the planet.2 From the 1960s through 2008,
per capita food availability worldwide has risen from 2220 kilocalories per person per day to 2790.3 Specifically, developing countries
have recorded a rise in available kilocalories per person per day, from
1850 to 2640.4 Yet, despite overall availability, around 815 million
people still suffer from hunger or some form of malnutrition.5
Approx-imately one in ten people are undernourished.6
Despite this grim reality there is room for hope. The global
trend is moving in the right direction.7 Between 1990 and 2015, the
“prevalence of undernourished people in developing countries declined from 23.3 to 12.9 percent.”8 For the first time in history the end
The author would like to thank his wife, daughter, and the rest of his family for
their unyielding love and support. He would also like to thank his advisor, Professor
Christopher Kelley, for his guidance. Finally, he would like to thank the Journal of
Food Law and Policy’s Editorial Board and Staff Editors for all their hard work and
suggestions. All errors are the authors and the authors alone. Michael Adkins is a JD
candidate, with an expected graduation of May 2019.
2 World Hunger, Poverty Facts, Statistics 2016 – World Hunger News, Hunger Notes,
http://www.worldhunger.org/2015-world-hunger-and-poverty-facts-and-statistics/
(last visited Dec. 12, 2018).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Food and Agric. Org. of the United Nations Et al., The State of Food
Security and Nutrition in the World vi (2017), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i7695e. pdf
[hereinafter The State of Food Security and Nutrition 2017].
6 See United States Agency for int’l dev., U.S. Gov’t Global Food Security
Strategy FY 2017-2021 2 (2016). https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/1867/USG-Global-Food-Security-Strategy-2016.pdf (stating that “nearly
800 million people around the world are chronically undernourished”).
7 See generally Sharad Tandon Et Al., Progress and Challenges in Global
Food Security, United States Dep’t of Argic. (2017), http://ageconsearch.umn.
edu/record/262131/files/eib-175.pdf?subformat=pdfa (finding that “[g]lobal food
security has improved over the past 15 years, [though] challenges and opportunities
remain.”).
8 Id. at 4.
1
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of hunger is within reach.9 But while “the world is [now] closer than
ever before to ending global hunger,” United States (U.S.) policymakers still face significant challenges.10 “Urbanization, gender inequality,
[instability,] conflict, the effects of climate change,” and the inevitable
rise in global population are all factors that must be addressed for any
decline in world hunger to be sustainable.11 Over the last two de-cades,
great progress has been made in global food security.12 In 2016,
however, the number of global undernourished increased.13 While it is
currently difficult to determine whether the downward trend is actually reversing, many challenges clearly lie ahead in the fight for food
security.14
On July 20, 2016, President Barack Obama signed the Global
Food Security Act of 2016 (the Act) into law.15 The Act authorized a
“comprehensive strategic approach for United States (U.S.) foreign
assistance to developing [nations.]”16 It was enacted to “reduce global
poverty and hunger, achieve food and nutrition security, [and] promote
inclusive, sustainable, agricultural-led economic growth...”17 It calls
for a “whole-of-government”18 strategy, a modern approach that integrates monitoring, evaluation, and learning aimed at strengthening the
capacity of all global participants throughout the food and agricultural
food system.19 Humanitarianism, however, was not the sole motivation behind the Act’s passage; it was also enacted for national security
purposes.20 Expanded strategic engagement in countries rife with food
insecurity “will improve [our] ability to anticipate and react to upheaval in regions crucial to U.S. national security.”21 Greater access and
United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 1.
at 3.
11 Id.
12 Tandon Et Al, supra note 7, at 4 .
13 The State of Food Security and Nutrition 2017, supra note 5, at 1.
14 Id. at ii.
15 Global Food Security Act of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 9301 (2016); Anuj
Krishnamurthy, Feeding the Future? One Year After the Global Food Security Act,
NewSecurityBeat (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2017/08/
feeding-future-one-year-after/.
16 Global Food Security Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-195, 130 Stat 675 (2016).
17 Global Food Security Act of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 9301 (2016).
18 Id. § 9302(b)(1) (2016).
19 United States Agency for int’l development, supra note 6, at iv.
20 Global Food Security Act of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 9301(2) (2016).
21 Cullen S. Hendrix, When Hunger Strikes: How Food Security Abroad
9

10 Id.
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insight into the cultures and politics of these countries, at their most
basic level, is a positive side effect to humanitarian relief.
Various key elements are identified as objectives to help facilitate a successful implementation. The first is evidence based investment targeting – strategically focusing on areas and approaches where
the greatest potential for sustainable improvements exists.22 The second is implementing the “comprehensive, multi-faceted whole-of-government approach rooted in lessons learned” and best evidence that reflects emerging global and technological trends.23 Third is recognizing
that the targeted countries must take the lead and be responsible for
their own progress.24 Fourth is “[partnering with diverse] development
actors and groups” to improve the “reach, effectiveness, efficiency,
and sustainability” of U.S. investments.25 Fifth is “harnessing the
power of science, technology, and innovation to dramatically
improve” local capacity and agriculture system practices.26 And sixth
is enhanced pro-gram sustainability so that eventually agricultural and
developmental assistance to foreign nations is no longer necessary.27
The Act is not a food aid bill; its scope, goals, and funding
mechanisms are strategic. While in certain ways the Act expands upon
existing U.S. commit-ments to provide acute humanitarian relief,28 its
main goal is to assist in sustainable, targeted country development.
At the World Food Congress in 1963, President John F. Kennedy articulated a vision to eliminate world hunger: “as members of
the human race, we have the means, we have the capacity to eliminate
hunger from the face of the earth in our lifetimes. We need only the
will.”29 Clearly, the goal he set forth has yet to materialize. Hunger,
famine, drought, regional instability, and resource driven military
Matters for National Security at Home 3 The Chicago Council on Global
Affairs (2016), https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/Report_When_
Hunger_Strikes_1604.pdf .
22 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at iii.
23 Id. at iv.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 United States Agency for int’l development, supra note 6, at iii.
28 Sharad Tandon Et Al., Progress and Challenges in Global Food Security
3 (2017).
29 John F. Kennedy, President, United States of America, Remarks at the Opening
Session of the World Food Congress, (June 4, 1963) (quoted by Susan E. Rice, Nat’l
Sec. Advisor, Exec. Office of the president, Remarks at the Chicago Council Global
Food Security Conference (May 22, 2014)).
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conflict remain pervasive in a world whose population is projected to
reach 9 billion by 2050.30 Many questions also remain on how
humanity will respond and cope with climate change.31 Yet, modern
sophisticated technologies from diverse sectors, coupled with rapid
modes of communication and data sharing, are all available now, and
the Act mandates they be utilized in the fight against food insecurity.32
Kennedy’s words ring truer today than ever before in modern human
history.33
II. Historical Overview of the Act’s Origins
For nearly six decades the U.S. has been a leader in the
fight to end food insecurity.34 In the process, it has been the source of
“about half of global food aid, as well as provided bilateral and
multilateral support for agricultural development and trade.”35 Food
aid programs of the 1950s were initially implemented as a means to
“discharge food surpluses” while increasing the supply of food to the
global poor.36 While these programs were meant to provide assistance,
“in reality [they] proved [at times] problematic for many aid recipient
countries.”37 For example, as the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Food for Peace program dumped surplus
wheat into developing countries’ markets, these countries’ domestic
food prices plummeted.38 In turn, local farmers could no longer compete.39 Dependence on U.S. wheat increased, and by 1986, seven out
of ten of the leading importers of U.S. farm commodities were Food
for Peace recipients.40 Despite our efforts to alleviate global hunger,
Cullen S. Hendrix, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, When Hunger
Strikes: How Food Security Abroad Matters for National Security at Home
(2016).
31 Responding to Climate Change,NASA Gʟᴏʙ. Cʟɪᴍᴀᴛᴇ Cʜᴀɴɢᴇ, https://climate.
nasa.gov/solutions/adaptation-mitigation/ (last visited Dec. 13, 2018).
32 Feed the Future, The U.S. Government’s GlobalFood Security Research Strategy 7
(2017), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1867/
GFS_2017_Research_Strategy_508C.pdf [hereinafter Feed the Future 2017]
33 See United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at iii (discussing the
ability to feed the world and imperativeness of doing so).
34 Sharad Tandon Et Al., supra note 7, at 1.
35 Id. at What Is the Issue?.
36 William D. Schanbacher, The Politics of Food 32 (2010).
37 Id. at 32–3.
38 Id. at 33.
39 Id.
40 Id.
30
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by 2000, the dawn of the new millennium, an estimated 900 million
people still were afflicted by food insecurity.41
A. Food Security
The definition of food security most frequently used today
originates from the 1996 World Food Summit of the Food and Agriculture Organizations of the United Nations (FAO): “food security
exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs
and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”42 Most analysts
define three primary attributes of food security.43 Some analysts,
however, add a fourth.44 Availability is the first pillar and simply refers
to the overall “supply” of food available, while the second pillar,
access, refers to the “range of food choices open to people” based on
their socioeconomic status.45 The concept of utilization comprises the
third pillar and “reflects whether individuals and households make
good use of the food” they have access to.46 The fourth pillar, stability,
encom-passes all three of the above and perhaps is the most elusive; it
refers to how susceptible individuals and households are to
“interruptions in availability, access or utilization.”47 The Act has built
in mechanisms to address all four of the food security pillars.
However, it takes spe-cial aim at the fourth.48
B. The 2008 Food Price Crisis and a Modern Approach to Food
Security
In 2008, as food prices spiked as they had in the 1970s, the
world experienced another food security crisis driven by market
volatility.49 The World Bank estimated that due to the 2008 crisis,
The State of Food Security and Nutrition 2017, supra note 5, at 2.
Sharad Tandon Et Al., supra note 7, at 9.
43 Christopher B. Barrett, Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability 6
(Christopher B. Barrett ed., 1st ed. 2013).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 7.
47 Id.
48 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 72.
49 Food and Agric. Org. of the United Nations, High Food Prices: The Food Security
Crisis of 2007-2008 and Recent Food Price Increases – Facts and Lessons, FAO,
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ISFP/High_food_prices.pdf (last
visited Dec. 13, 2018).
41

42
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50 million people were thrust back into poverty.50 Indeed, without an
organized commitment, and due to the acute nature of the price
increases, many actions taken in the wake of this crisis were transient,“[focusing] mainly on distribution of agricultural inputs” and not
on a long-term goal of sustainability.51 This distribution of resources
without “training, or other associated technical assistance,” limited the
effect of the resources and did not lead to sustainable solutions.52
Sustainability is “particularly [elusive] when underlying structural and
management problems are not addressed.”53
After the crisis of 2008, the U.S. increased focus on agricultural development by increased spending and the creation of the
Bureau for Food Security within USAID.54 But as a result of globalization, policy makers still wrestled with the “transition from the time
when national food markets were more self-contained than the present
global food system.”55 By 2010, food security was a top priority,56 and
the Obama administration established Feed the Future, the U.S. government’s global hunger and food security initiative.57 From the beginning, Feed the Future utilized a “whole of government” approach.58
This framework would later be codified in the Act.59
On May 22, 2014, former National Security Advisor, Susan E.
Rice, addressed the Chicago Council Global Food Security conference.60 She spoke of the quantifiable successes of Feed the Future
and suggested four areas of focus necessary for the “[achievement] of
Id. at 2.
Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Eric Munoz, The Global Food Security Act is Pushing to the Finish Line, Oxfam
(Apr. 15, 2016), https://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/2016/04/the-global-foodsecurity-act-is-pushing-to-the-finish-line
/2016/04/the-global-food-security-act-ispushing-to-the-finish-line.
55 Tim Josling, The Oxford Handbook on The World Trade Organization 655
(Amrita Narlikar et al. eds., 2012).
56 Id.; see Fᴇᴇᴅ ᴛʜᴇ Fᴜᴛᴜʀᴇ, https://www.feedthefuture.gov (last visited Dec. 13,
2018) (evidencing the commitment and concern food security garnered in U.S. policy).
57 Munoz, supra note 54.
58 Karen Hansen-Kuhn, Making U.S. Trade Policy Serve Global Food Security Goals,
11 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 9, 9 (2011).
59 Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 6.
60 Susan E. Rice, Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan E. Rice at the Chicago
Council Global Food Security Conference, The White House (May 22, 2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/22/remarks-nationalsecurity-advisor-susan-e-rice-chicago-council-global-fo.
50

51
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food security on a global scale” for modern times.61 In fact, Feed the
Future became a tremendous success and generated strong bipartisan
support.62 Ultimately, Rice’s suggestions were largely adopted and
codified in the Act,63 and the first comprehensive strategy to address
global hunger was born.64
The Act easily passed both chambers of Congress and commits the U.S. to continued engagement in the fight to enhance global
food security, reduce poverty, and improve nutrition.65 Pursuant to the
Act, USAID published the Global Food Security Strategy to focus on
achieving these goals through “three interrelated and interdependent
objectives: (1) Inclusive and sustainable agricultural-led economic
growth . . . (2) strengthened resilience among people and systems . . .
and (3) a well-nourished population.”66
However, as of 2017, the U.S. is “one of the few [nations] in
the world that [still] oppose the idea of a human right to food.”67 The
right is not treated as a “formal enforceable obligation.”68 Traditionally, the Bretton Woods institutions and the U.S. government “emphasiz[e] liberalization, deregulation, privatization, and the compression
of domestic budgets.”69 At the 2002 World Food Summit in Rome, the
Bush administration’s final statement articulated America’s approach
to food security as premised not on an international human right to
food, but on “local governments having the primary responsibility to
provide for their citizens.”70 For purposes of retaining autonomy and
flexibility the U.S. has consistently declined to participate in any “inId.
Liz Schrayer, The Surprise Bipartisan Success Story of Congress: American Aid
,
Tɪᴍᴇ (Sept. 13, 2016), http://time.com/4487397/bipartisan-success-congress/.
63 Compare Rice, supra note 60 (listing goals to achieve food security on a global
scale), with Global Food Security Act of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 9301 (2016) (listing
strategies to achieve global food security).
64 Anuj Krishnamurthy, Feeding the Future? One Year After the Global Food Security
Act, NewSecurityBeat (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.newsecuritybeat. org/2017/08/
feeding-future-one-year-after/.
65 United States Agency for int’l Dev., supra note 6, at 7.
66 Id. at iii.
67 The Human Right to Food and Dignity, Hᴜᴍᴀɴ Rɪɢʜᴛ Mᴀɢ., Vol. 37 (2010), https://
www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_
vol37_2010/winter2010/the_human_right_to_food_and_dignity.html.
68 Human Rights Council 13th Session, United States Explanation of Position
on the Right to Food (L.17) (Mar. 24, 2010), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/179236.pdf.
69 Schanbacher, supra note 36, at 31.
70 Id.
61
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ternationally binding agreement to provide food security for the rest of
the world.”71
By broadly focusing on “partnership[s] with other governments, civil society, multilateral development institutions, research
institutions, universities, and the private sector,” the Act largely
adheres to this established ideological position; it does not depart from
tradition.72 What follows is a comment on the Act’s framework that
aims to demonstrate how and why it should be embraced. Whether the
Act can meet its objectives in the existing global order is dependent on
a multitude of factors and well beyond the scope of this paper. One
thing, however, is certain. The old way of largely providing emergency assistance alone was not working to address the fundamental causes
of food insecurity, and in a rapidly changing world, a new approach to
combating global hunger is needed.73 This Act has great promise.
III. Policy, Strategy, and the Whole-of-Government Approach
It is “in the national interest of the [U.S.]” to promote global
food security.74 Accordingly, as a matter of national security and foreign policy, the Act tasks the president with coordinating all relevant
federal departments and agencies to implement the Global Food Security Strategy efficiently and effectively.75 The relevant federal agencies
are to provide “diverse, technical, programmatic, in-kind, and financial contributions” that must be coordinated.76 The strategy proposed
to accomplish this is by “[building] upon platforms and enhanced
mechanisms at the global, regional, and country levels to leverage
Id. at 32.
See generally, United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6 (listing broad
objectives without required obligations).
73 See generally The State of Food Security and Nutrition 2017, supra note 5
(outlining what is needed to increase global food security and nutrition).
74 22 U.S.C. § 9302(a) (2016).
75 Id. at § 9302 (3)(b) (2016). See id. at § 9304(c)(1) (2016) (mandating that all
relevant agencies submit to the appropriate congressional committees… an agency
specific plan how to for implementing the Act).
76 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 38. See 22 U.S.C. §
9301(4)(7) (2016) (defining relevant federal departments and agencies as the “United
States Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, the
Department of Commerce, the Department of State, the Department of the Treasury,
the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation,
the Peace Corps, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, the United
States African Development Foundation, and the United States Geological
Survey . . .”).
71

72
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technical expertise, data, and resources.”77 Efficient coordination of
each agency’s research investments are therefore critical to the successful implementation of this Act.78 Necessarily, “research themes”79
were identified to ensure all “stages of the food security [research and
development] pipeline,” across all varying agencies and partner countries, are united toward the same ends.80 In light of all the challenges
standing in the way of food security, research and development will
prove to be one of, if not the most, crucial components in the fight.81
Similarly, for flexibility and fiscal responsibility the strate-gy
makes clear that “regular consultation and collaboration with key
stakeholders [and pertinent] congressional committees” will take
place, so as to “avoid duplication of [American] investments.”82 In
fact, accountability for results and transparency are central elements of
the monitoring, evaluation, and learning approach the Act utilizes to
track progress.83 Built into the structure of the Strategy is the constant
pursuit of the efficient and effective use of taxpayer dollars.84
IV. Interrelated and Interdependent Objectives of the Act
A. Inclusive and Sustainable Agricultural-led Economic
Growth:
United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 38.
See generally Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32 (discussing the need for
cooperation and coordination in addressing global food insecurity).
79 Id. at 7 (“I. Technologies and practices that advance the productivity frontier to
drive income growth, improve diets and promote natural resource conservation; II.
Technologies and practices that reduce, manage and mitigate risk to support resilient,
prosperous, well-nourished individuals, households, and communities; and III.
Improved knowledge on how to achieve human outcomes: generating evidence on how
to sustainably and equitably improve economic opportunity, nutrition and resilience).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 9.
82 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 38. See 22 U.S.C. §
9303(5) (2016) (defining “key stakeholders” as “actors engaged in efforts to
advance global food security programs and objectives, including relevant
Federal departments and agencies; national and local governments; other bilateral
donors; international and regional organizations; international, regional, and local
financial institutions; international, regional, and local private voluntary,
nongovernmental, faith-based, and civil society organizations; the private sector,
including agribusinesses and relevant commodities groups; agricultural producers,
including farmers organizations, cooperatives, small-scale producers, and
women; and agricultural research and academic institutions, including land grant
universities and extension services”).
83 Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 13.
84 Id.
77
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Agricultural led growth builds from the ground up and strives
to ensure the “availability of food [while] generating income from
production” for those at the greatest risk of food insecurity.85 Agricultural led growth also aims to “[create] employment and [entrepreneurial] opportunities throughout the value chain.”86 When there is
broad, inclusive employment in the agriculture sector, especially for
smallholder farms, local partners can decrease their reliance on inputs
from development assistance programs.87 Smallholder farms are those
cultivated on two hectares or under.88 Over half the people in poor
countries who “[work in the] agriculture sector . . . live in smallholder
households.”89 In many instance these people are vulnerable to the
climate and “markets… and rely substantially on self-provisioning.”90
Sustainable output of smallholder agriculture is therefore vital for
global food security.91
B. Strengthened Resilience Among People and Systems:
In underdeveloped regions, people caught in the cycle of
poverty have more difficulty sustainably emerging from poverty when
“shocks and stresses” to the environment and political landscape
occur.92 Increased resilience among these populations is therefore vital
for sustainable food security.93 But without reliable markets, civil institutions, or infrastructure to mitigate stressors or food shortages, the
cycle of poverty and hunger will persist. Thus, strengthening the resiliency of people will necessarily involve investment in infrastructure.94

United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 28.
Id.
87 Id. at 8.
88 Rebecca Nelson & Richard Coe, Transforming Research and Development Practice
to Support Agroecological Intensification of Smallholder Farming, 67 J. Int’l Aff.
107, 107 (2014).
89 Food and Agric. Org. of the United Nations, Sᴍᴀʟʟʜᴏʟᴅᴇʀ ᴀɴᴅ Fᴀᴍɪʟʏ Fᴀʀᴍᴇʀ
1 (2012), http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/nr/sustainability_pathways/docs/
Factsheet_SMALLHOLDERS.pdf [hereinafter Sᴍᴀʟʟʜᴏʟᴅᴇʀꜱ ᴀɴᴅ Fᴀᴍɪʟʏ Fᴀʀᴍᴇʀ].
90 Nelson & Coe, supra note 88, at 108.
91 Id.
92 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at iii.
93 Id. at 8.
94 Id. at 14–15.
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With strengthened infrastructure, nations will be able to increase production sustainably, thus mitigating risk and enhancing recovery from
environmental and political stressors.95 Despite inevitable “shocks and
stresses,” improved infrastructure will strengthen resiliency and allow
progress in the agricultural sector to take hold. Ultimately it will
“[reduce] reliance upon emergency food assistance.96
C. A Well-nourished Population:
While adequate nutrition is important to men, women, and
children of all ages, the Act focuses especially on women and children, from the time of the child’s conception until the child turns
two.97 Undernutrition during this vulnerable period can produce “lower levels of educational attainment” and limit lifetime productivity.98
Further, women on average provide “43 percent of the agricultural
labor force of developing countries.”99 Women’s continued and increased participation is thus an essential ingredient for sustainability in
production systems.100 Improved sanitation and clean water is another
factor address by the Strategy.101 Ultimately, the Strategy’s objective is
to “[increase] consumption of nutritious and safe” foods in healthy
household and communities.102
V. Key Elements Identified to Strengthen Ability to Achieve
Objectives
A. Targeting Investments
Since the release of the Strategy, the “first twelve Feed the
Future” target countries were selected.103 These countries were
deemed to possess the “greatest potential [for] the sustainable
[improvement of] food security” for their people.104 The U.S. has
chosen these countries as partners with the goal of “[harnessing] the
Id. at 8.
Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 9.
97 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at iii.
98 Id.
99 Sᴍᴀʟʟʜᴏʟᴅᴇʀ ᴀɴᴅ Fᴀᴍɪʟʏ Fᴀʀᴍᴇʀ, supra note 89, at 1.
100 Id.
101 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 22.
102 Id. at 10.
103 Feed The Future 2017, supra note 32, at 7.
104 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at iii.
95
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power of agriculture to jumpstart their economies.”105 The countries
include: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya,
Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda.106
The criteria used to select target countries included: (1) the
level of need; (2) potential for agricultural-led growth; (3) opportunities for [local] partnership; (4) opportunities for regional economic
integration; (5) U.S. Government resource availability; and (6) the
targeted government’s commitment to food security investment and
policy reform.107 While specific beneficiaries will be targeted for
short term and medium term impact, the overall strategy is to
improve in-stitutions, markets, choices, and opportunities at a
systemic level.108 A wide variety of actors from the public sector,
private sector, and civil society will be engaged.109
B. Developing Countries Must Take the Lead
The Act is structured to respond to the inherent diversity of
farming practices and needs of the target countries.110 The Strategy
thus requires target countries to “own and be empowered to lead and
guide efforts to drive [their own] progress.”111 This model is designed
to address one of the significant challenges of global food security,
namely, that there “is no ‘one size fits all’” approach to improving
conditions, markets, and yields for farmers.112 As reflected in the
selection criteria, support will be lent to those countries whose national and local governments actively coordinate and develop institutional capabilities and accountability mechanisms that provide strong

Sasha Jenkins, US Takes Step Forward in Fight Against Global Hunger, Global
Citizen (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/us-fightsagainst-global-hunger/.
106 Feed The Future 2017, supra note 32, at 7.
107 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 36.
108 Id. at 37.
109 Id.
110 See Global Food Security Act of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 9302 (2016) (stating the
policy objective of “promoting global food security” and listing the various
programs, activities, and initiatives that reinforce national food security investment
plans).
111 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 41.
112 Jefferey D. Sachs, The Age of Sustainable Development 327 (2015) (“Farmers
differ incredibly in what they grow; how they grow it; and the challenges of climate,
soil, water, topography, pests, biodiversity, and transport costs they face. These
variations in turn have an enormous farm systems and strategies.”).
105
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working relationships with both the private sector and civil society.113
Active coordination between the private and public sectors, coupled
with direct U.S. involvement, will yield localized (particularized)
solutions tailored to local conditions leading to food insecurity in the
target countries. The aggregate of insights into local solutions to food
insecurity are a step developing “solutions for a global sustainable
food supply.”114
C. Local Capacity and Partnerships
Of course, there are risks and vulnerabilities inherent in
work-ing with local populations; they may include: (1) weak systems
and internal controls; (2) limited capacity; and (3) competing
[political, social, or cultural] interests.115 Ineffective, corrupt, or toxic
localized politics may also stifle technological development and
productiv-ity.116 Yet, partnerships with key stakeholders will allow the
U.S.
to “leverage the required skill, expertise, technologies, assets, and
resources to improve our effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability
of development efforts.”117 The goal is to achieve a diverse,
transparent, inclusively broad range of partners118 that not only include
those in the public and private sectors, but also those in research
centers, educa-tional organizations,119 and multilateral development
institutions.120
VI. Science, Technology, Innovation, and the Sustainability of
Programs
At the heart of the Act’s objective is to achieve inclusive,
sustainable growth that builds resiliency among the people of
United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 41.
Sachs, supra note 112, at 327–28.
115 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 42.
116 See id. at 111 (stating that “corruption--the abuse of entrusted authority for
private gain-- remains a tremendous obstacle to political, social, and economic
development” and that “corruption affects food security by widening the gap
between rich and poor, deterring investment, and distorting markets”).
117 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 43.
118 See id.
119 Id. at 44.
120 Id.
121 Id. at iii.
113
114
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participating nations – for the purpose of maintaining a well-nourished
population.121 The Strategy breaks this objective into three distinct
categories, yet they can be read as one, with sustainability being the
operative word.122 As the Strategy frames it, sustainability requires that
“all development investments should catalyze the economic, political,
and social processes within those countries [to] yield ever-improving
lives for their citizens.”123
Proponents of the Act understand that sustained investments
in science and technology are critical for development and a sustainable reduction in global food insecurity.124 Scientific advancement and
technological innovation are therefore mandated by the Act;125
accordingly, relevant U.S. agencies have identified three overarching
research themes for each agency to pursue in the context of their own
expertise.126 This coordinated effort aims to ensure that diverse agency
actions remain in constant pursuit of the Act’s objectives, no matter
who, what, when, or where the relevant agency interacts with the
partner country’s agricultural sector.127 While theme I and II deal with
“scalable products and practice that [advance productivity, nutrition,
and risk mitigation,]” theme III takes a more anthropological approach
and seeks to understand the people of the target countries in a cultural
context.128
Research under theme III is arguably the most important. It
guides how and where research, program implementation, and technology are to be deployed for the most equitable distribution of food
security advancements.129 How people benefit is the ultimate test of
the Act’s merit: but without understanding the specific needs of the
people in target countries or how they interact with their political,
cultural, ecological, or global environments - in stable and unstable
times - food security will likely prove illusive.130 Theme III, through
its focus on “human behavior,” is designed to address these
concerns.131 Theme I is focused on the micro level and works to
increase crop yields, production efficiency, quality of nutrition, and
See id.
Id. at 42.
124 Id. 46.
125 Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 12; See Global Food Security Act
of 2016, 22 U.S.C. § 9302(a)(7) (2016).
126 Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 7.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 22.
130 Id. at 22–24.
131 Id.
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the value of agricultural products across the farm to market supply
chain.132 Theme II is con-cerned with safety, the promotion of
resilience, and the mitigation of risk.133 Many partners throughout
the U.S. government, private sector, universities, colleges, civil
society, and partner countries are tasked with implementing the
research strategy.134
In sum, the Act’s pervasive focus on perfected sustainability
is a departure from food aid programs of the past, has refined and
built upon current approaches to global food security and nutrition,
and has set U.S. policy with respect to agricultural assistance on a
proactive rather than reactive course.135 Further, the research themes
provide for flexible innovation over time, are aimed at culturally
sensitive advancement, and cover all pillars upon which food security
rests. They aim to enhance the interplay between all the elements
mentioned above with the overarching goal of sustainability.136
VI. Can the World Expect a Future Free from Hunger?
A. Climate Change in a Changing World:
Climate change is an artificially controversial topic. There is
broad consensus among the scientific community that the climate is in
fact changing, temperatures are in fact rising, and that the activities of
man are very likely a cause of its acceleration.137 Therefore, as peo-ple
struggle with climate change, the continued focus on women and
smallholder farms in the fight against global hunger is essential: “well
managed smallholder systems invest in building soil biomass and
vegetative cover [to improve] water filtration in case of floods, and
moisture retention” in the event of drought.138 Smallholder farms also
Id. 17–19.
Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 17–19.
134 See 22 U.S.C. § 9302(a)(3), (7), (8) (describing policy objectives behind the
Global Food Security Act); Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 20.
135 See generally United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at
46 (describing methods that provide infrastructure, knowledge, and research
for continuing sustainability).
136 Id. at 10 fig. 1.
137 See generally U.S. Gʟᴏʙᴀʟ Cʜᴀɴɢᴇ Rᴇsᴇᴀʀᴄʜ Pʀᴏɢʀᴀᴍ, Cʟɪᴍᴀᴛᴇ Sᴄɪᴇɴᴄᴇ Sᴘᴇᴄɪᴀʟ
Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ: Fᴏᴜʀᴛʜ Nᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ Cʟɪᴍᴀᴛᴇ Assᴇssᴍᴇɴᴛ (NCA4) Vᴏʟᴜᴍᴇ I (2017), https://
science2017.globalchange.gov (finding incredibly strong evidence supporting the
existence of climate change the role of human activity in its rapid acceleration).
138 Sᴍᴀʟʟʜᴏʟᴅᴇʀ ᴀɴᴅ Fᴀᴍɪʟʏ Fᴀʀᴍᴇʀ, supra note 89, at 2.
132
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have less dependence on fossil fuels and lower energy requirements.139
Further, traditional smallholder practices may also reduce emission
and enhance soil carbon sequestration.140 The uncertainty of climate
change is all the more reason a flexible, sustained, whole-of-government approach is needed. “Continuous learning, adaptation, and communication through monitoring and evaluation” is required to comprehend and respond to the many changing and unknown variables our
researchers and policymakers will face.141
B. Conflict, Instability, and the Global Economy:
With an increased global population comes increased
compe-tition for resources and thus the potential for continued
conflict. It is estimated by 2050, 9 billion people will inhabit this
planet.142 In 2016, with a global population of only 7.5 billion,143 there
were 19 countries marred by violence, civil war, or natural disaster.144
It is no surprise that countries in the grips of conflict or natural
calamity are more susceptible to persistent food insecurity.145 In fact,
over half of the world’s “chronically undernourished” reside in
countries in conflict.146 And from those countries, an estimated 100
million face “crisis-level food insecurity.”147 While traditional,
interstate warfare has decreased, the prevalence of intrastate conflict
has risen.148 But in the age of glo-balization many of these internal
conflicts are of regional and global concern and have implications
well beyond their borders.149
Furthermore, certain aspects of the global economy are “widely associated with ongoing global food insecurity.”150 For example,
economic policies that traditionally develop in wealthy, industrialized
Id.
Id.
141 Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 19 (discussing methods for increasing
adaptation and recovery from shocks and stress).
142 See, e.g., Tandon Et Al., supra note 7, at iii.
143 E.g., U. S. Census Bureau, U.S. ᴀɴᴅ Wᴏʀʟᴅ Pᴏᴘᴜʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴ Cʟᴏᴄᴋ, (Mar. 13, 2018)
https://www.census.gov/popclock/.
144 The State of Food Security and Nutrition 2017, supra note 5, at 30.
145 Id. at 35.
146 See id. (calculating the figure at 489 million out of a total of 815 million people). 147
The State of Food Security and Nutrition 2017, supra note 5, at 30.
148 Id. at 33.
149 Id.
150 Jennifer Clapp, World Hunger and the Global Economy: Strong Linkages, Weak
Action, 67 J. Int’l Aff. 1, 2 (2014).
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countries often contribute to “higher… more volatile food prices
and uneven distribution of food and agricultural assets.”151 Higher food
prices and the ensuing volatility can thus lead to, or exacerbate,
political instability.152 Price volatility is especially tough on rural
communities because when prices are unstable, smallholder farmers
cannot compete. They can lose their incentive to produce and lose their
land.153 While no specific trade policies are provided in the Act,
research theme III is designed to provide solutions to these complex
political, economic issues.154 The Act, by using the whole-of-government approach, works to address the problems caused by global
conflict and unstable markets.155 It does so by employing agencies
whose personnel are in direct, on the ground contact with the people in
the world’s poorest countries where they can provide the change and
support from the bottom up.156
C. Potential Shortcomings of the Act:
The Feed the Future Report states that no “legal or regulatory
impediments to implementation of the [strategy]” were identified.157
However, as stated above, regions in conflict will remain outside of
the Act’s reach due to the degree of cooperation and stability within a
target country required by the Act.
VII. Progress and State of the Act Since Passage
What began in 2009 as the Feed the Future initiative, by 2015
had “helped [millions of] farmers gain access to new tools and technologies.”158 The initiative had therefore helped millions of “farmers
and producers [improve] their crop yields.”159 Millions of children
were also affected by the implementation of nutrition programs.160 In
Id.
Hendrix, supra note 21, at 3.
153 Karen Hausen-Kuhn, Making Trade Policy Serve Global Food Security Goals, 11
Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 9, 10-11 (2011).
154 Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 22-24.
155 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 28.
156 See id. at 45.
157 Feed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 24.
158 Annika Reno, How Obama’s Feed the Future Initiative Helped Millions in 2015,
Global Citizen (Aug. 6, 2016) https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/
obamas-feed-the-future-initiative-impacts-millions/.
159 Jenkins, supra note 105.
160 Id.
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2016 alone, Feed the Future reached “nearly eleven million smallscale food producers.”161 In partnership with USAID it “trained more
that 3.7 million people in child health and nutrition; it also trained
thousands of local health facilities on how to effectively cope with
malnutrition.162 By July 19, 2017, approximately one year after the
Act’s passage,163 118 bipartisan lawmakers and advocates gathered in
Washington, D.C., to “celebrate [its] success.”164 Those congregated
“expressed continued dedication to food security initiatives like those
implemented under the Act.”165 Food security was a “great unifier.”166
The Act of 2016 was “one of the few bipartisan pieces of
legislation to emerge in recent years.”167 Initially, under the Trump
administration, there was a markedly divergent direction in policy
priorities.168 For example, in early November of 2017, the Undersecretary of International Affairs at the Treasury Department announced
that “the U.S. is not expecting to make any future contributions to the
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP),” a multilateral development institution implicated in the Act.169 This program,
administered by the World Bank, “channels member pledges of assistance to developing countries agriculture projects.”170
However, in 2018, again with broad bipartisan support, the
Act was reauthorized.171 But only time will tell if the Act is implemented as Congress intended, or if the Act survives another reauthoFeed the Future 2017, supra note 32, at 3.
Id.
163 Anuj Krishnamurthy, supra note 15.
164 See Avery Friedman, Celebrating a Year of Success for the Global Food Security
Act, Global Citizen (July 20, 2017), https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/gfsayear-food-security-event/.
165 Id.
166 Michael J. Puma & Peter B. de Menocal, Trump’s Unifying Opportunity: Food
Security, Columbia University Center for Climate and Life (Mar. 2, 2017),
http://climateandlife.columbia.edu/2017/03/02/trumps-unifying-opportunity-foodsecurity/.
167 Id.
168 See id.
169 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Treasury Takes Aim at Global Food Security
Program, Foreign Policy (Nov. 10, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/10/
treasury-takes-aim-at-global-food-security-program-obama-agriculture-farmers/.
170 Jennifer Clapp, supra note 150.
171 Global Food Security Reauthorization Act Confirms US Commitment to Food
Security, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs (Oct. 12, 2018), https://
www.thechicagocouncil.org/press-release/global-food-security-reauthorization-actconfirms-us-commitment-food-security.
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rization. Regardless, the Act’s modern approach to food security is a
model for how best to unify and apply the strengths of our public and
private sector alike to a problem that without strong, dedicated, global
leadership, will unquestionably remain.
VIII. Conclusion
Sustenance in the form of food and water is behind only
ox-ygen as the most fundamental ingredients essential for human existence.172 Without it, there is little hope. Not only is the cycle of
poverty and malnourishment devastating to those who experience it
directly, food insecurity leads to instability in the broader world. It
lays fertile ground for extremism and conflict, directly affecting
national security. Continued adherence to this Act and the continued
focus on improving the lives of the most vulnerable will not only
produce a positive return on our investments, but it is the right thing to
do. In the long run its approach and built in mechanisms for flexibility
allow for continued learning and adaptation to the changing world
from the ground up.173
The Act is the American government’s current approach to
combating food insecurity. One thing, however, is certain: our leaders
must maintain the will to implement the Act as designed. It must not
be starved of funding. Despite its shortcomings and limitations, the
Act is an example of American foreign policy at its best. Taking into
account our global reach, tools, and the technologies at our command,
we have the power to make a difference in one of the most fundamental, visceral issues of our time. Food insecurity will assuredly not
dissolve overnight, but through sustained engagement with the developing world, we can work pragmatically to help break the cycle that
leads to perpetual poverty, malnourishment, and starvation. It would
be unwise for our leadership to squander such strong bipartisan support, agreement, and momentum. It would be an abdication of global
leadership on an issue we are uniquely equipped to solve. This strategy is not zero sum. For if one family starves, or one child dies,
wheth-er in our own neighborhood or a world and culture away, we all
suffer. One way or another, whether it be refugees fleeing famine,
extremists sewing instability in vulnerable lands, volatile commodity
See Five Basic Needs to Survive and Thrive, Santevia (June 16, 2016), https://
www.santevia.com/blog/5-basic-needs-to-survive-and-thrive/.
173 United States Agency for int’l dev., supra note 6, at 6.
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prices, or personal feelings of guilt, sadness, empathy, or
powerlessness – chron-ic global hunger touches us all.
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